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I. INTRODUCTION
The sale of used cars' is big business. Used car sales in the
United States outnumber new car sales three to two. In 1984, con-
sumers spent $90.8 billion dollars on 16.8 million used cars.2 They
purchased about half of these cars from dealers and half from pri-
vate parties.3 The average price of $5,400 makes purchase of a used
car a major investment for most persons. Often the investment
goes sour because of mechanical defects discovered after the sale.
In most cases, the defects existed at the time the deal was made.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law; B.A., Williams
College, 1968; J.D., New York University, 1974; L.L.M., New York University, 1981. I appre-
ciate the support of the Cowley Endowment and the research assistance of Joe Maynard,
Jr., a student at the University of Montana School of Law.
1. This article is restricted to sales to consumers, that is, purchasers for personal, fam-
ily, or household purposes. It is not restricted to the sale of used automobiles, but encom-
passes the purchase by a consumer of any used vehicle, whether automobile, truck, or mo-
torcycle. Because the phrase "used vehicle" does not roll trippingly from the tongue, the
more familiar-sounding "used car" is employed.
2. Hertz Corp. Press Information, release dated June 24, 1985. The release also indi-
cates that the average used car sold in 1984 was 4.5 years old and had 45,000 miles on it.
Statistical information on used car sales is available from Hertz Corp., 660 Madison Ave.,
New York, NY 10021.
3. Id. This article focuses on remedies available to purchasers from dealers. Many of
the remedies discussed in Parts II, III, VI, and VII are applicable to sales between private
parties, but the legislation discussed in Parts IV, V, and VIII is generally applicable only to
dealers.
4. Federal Trade Commission, Trade Regulation Rule Concerning the Sale of Used
Motor Vehicles, Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory Analysis, 49 Fed. Reg.
45,692 (1984) (Rule codified at 16 C.F.R. § 455 (1986)) [hereinafter cited as FTC State-
ment]. The FTC Statement is based on the Final Staff Report on the Used Motor Vehicle
Industry. The Staff Report was not adopted by the Commission. The findings are based on
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Sale of a "big ticket" item such as a used car has substantial
legal ramifications. Nevertheless, few purchasers consult an attor-
ney. Acting on their own, purchasers often fail to understand the
legal effect of any warranty or of sale "as is." Approximately one-
half of the used cars marketed by dealers are sold "as is."' Sale "as
is" means that the purchaser agrees to accept the car without the
warranties otherwise implied in a sales contract by state law.' By
using this disclaimer of warranties, the seller shifts to the pur-
chaser the responsibility for any mechanical defects in the car.7
Moreover, the sales abuses endemic to the industry further
purchasers' misunderstanding.8 The most common abuse occurs
when a dealer makes oral representations regarding the mechanical
condition of a car and then disclaims them in an "as is" clause in
the written agreement. A dealer may compound the abuse by mis-
representing the meaning of the term "as is" or by failing to cor-
rect a purchaser's misunderstanding of it.'
Whether it disclaims implied warranties or not, a seller may
make express warranties that induce the purchaser to buy the
car. 10 If a purchaser brings an action on grounds that these repre-
sentations were false, a court may find that the promises were
mere sales talk, not to be taken seriously. Or it may find that the
parol evidence rule prevents the purchaser from proving that the
statements were part of the contract.11
information obtained in 1979.
5. Id. at 45,696.
6. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316(3)(a) (1985).
7. Studies conducted prior to 1979 cited in the FTC Statement, supra note 4, showed
average repair costs of $109 to $235.
8. FTC Statement, supra note 4, 45,696-702. This observation has a long history in
popular culture. It was often asked about Richard Nixon, "Would you buy a used car from
this man?" A recent movie entitled Used Cars featured the outrageous tactics of two broth-
ers competing in the used car business. A poll taken each year indicating the public's trust
of various professions generally lists used car salespersons at the bottom, below even
lawyers.
9. "The practices are pervasive and among the chief sources of complaints received by
various consumer protection organizations throughout the country." FTC Statement, supra
note 4, 45,702. It goes without saying that there are honest used car dealers. Nevertheless, as
this article should make clear, current market conditions favor the dishonest dealer. A
dealer who can misrepresent a car's condition or shift to a purchaser the risk of defects,
gains a market advantage over a dealer who discloses a car's condition and who assumes the
cost of repairs. A rational consumer shopping on the basis of apparent condition and low
price will choose a dishonest dealer.
10. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-313 (1985).
11. The rule, enacted in Montana at MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-202 (1985), provides:
FINAL WRITTEN EXPRESSION-PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. Terms with respect to
which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set
forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement
with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by
2
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At common law, purchasers encountered difficulty recovering
against used car dealers. The prevailing business standard, caveat
emptor, made formidable purchasers' attempts to avoid a contract
or to obtain damages.12 Traditional contract doctrine, developed in
an age of laissez-faire capitalism, favors sellers. Because the doc-
trine presupposes a free market in which both sellers and purchas-
ers are responsible for ascertaining the facts, courts must stretch
traditional concepts to allow a consumer to escape from a bad
bargain.
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), adopted in the 1960's,
provides little assistance to purchasers. Applicable to all transac-
tions involving the sale of goods, the UCC makes few distinctions
between consumers and commercial purchasers, who generally
have more knowledge and more bargaining power. Furthermore,
under both the common law and the UCC, the prevailing party in
a lawsuit does not recover transaction costs, such as attorneys'
fees, from the loser. The seller, who has greater resources, experi-
ence, and economies of scale can usually take advantage of the
purchaser's weaker financial position. These factors make litigation
a losing proposition for the purchaser of a used car."3
Recent legislation has begun to redress this imbalance, afford-
ing the purchaser new claims for relief. Recognizing that the equal
knowledge necessary for free market conditions rarely exists in
practice, these statutes attempt to approximate it, either by regu-
lating the practices of sellers that prey on purchasers' ignorance, or
by requiring disclosures. By allowing successful purchasers to re-
cover transaction costs, the legislation rewards those who bring
evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may
be explained or supplemented:
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (30-1-205) or by course of
performance (30-2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds
the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement.
12. See, e.g., Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118
(1922).
13. The inhibiting effect of transaction costs are discussed in Burnham, Contract
Damages in Montana, Part I: Expectancy Damages, 44 MONT. L. REv. 1 (1983). The tactical
advantages a "repeat player" enjoys over a "one-shot player" in the litigation game are dis-
cussed in Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y. REv. 95 (1974). These factors indicate why so few of the used car
complaints reported to government agencies end up in court. See Wolford, Relief for the
Motor Vehicle Purchaser, Wis. BAR BULL., Aug. 1981, at 12; McEttrick, Defective Motor
Vehicles: The Massachusetts Lemon Law and Recent Used Car Cases Under Chapter 93A,
70 MAss. L. REV. 30, 37 (1985).
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claims in the public interest.14
This article enumerates the variety of claims for relief pres-
ently available to the purchaser of a defective used car.1" It also
addresses the fundamental question of whether a used car pur-
chaser is entitled to a certain level of performance from the car.
Finally, it analyzes legislation that would provide additional assis-
tance to purchasers by requiring that used car dealers disclose de-
fects or warrant a minimum level of performance.
II. COMMON LAW
A. The Parol Evidence Rule
In making a claim against a used car dealer, a purchaser often
claims that a representation was made which was not reduced to
writing. The purchaser attempts to prove either that the represen-
tation is part of the contract or that it prevented formation of the
contract. To tender proof of the oral representation, however, the
purchaser may have to overcome the considerable hurdle of the pa-
rol evidence rule."0
The intention of the rule is to give finality to the written
agreement of the parties." A party who claims that additional
terms were not incorporated in the sales agreement may be barred
from presenting proof of those terms. For example, in Green Chev-
rolet Co. v. Kemp,' s the purchaser and his wife testified that the
sales person had told them the car was guaranteed for a year and
that if they were not satisfied they could bring it back for adjust-
ments. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held the testimony inad-
missible where the written agreement contained no such
provisions.19
The rule has three significant exceptions. Parol evidence may
be offered on issues of integration, interpretation, or formation.
1. Integration
Because the rule applies only where the parties intended the
14. The United States Supreme Court approved the policy of deputizing "private at-
torneys general" to carry out Congressional policy in Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390
U.S. 400 (1968).
15. Claims for personal injury resulting from the defect are beyond the scope of this
article. It deals only with damage to the defective car itself, usually the cost of repair or
replacement.
16. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-202 (1985), supra note 11.
17. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.2 (1982).
18. 241 Ark. 62, 406 S.W.2d 142 (1966).
19. Id. at 63, 406 S.W.2d at 143.
[Vol. 47
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writing to integrate their final and complete understanding, evi-
dence may be offered to show that the writing reflected only part
of their agreement.20 That is, the parties may have intended that
their agreement be partly written and partly oral, with the oral
part containing representations omitted from the writing. By in-
serting a merger clause in the writing, a seller may defeat a pur-
chaser's attempt to prove such an intention. A merger clause states
that the written agreement contains the entire understanding of
the parties and that there are no other understandings, oral or
written.2" While the presence of a merger clause poses presumptive
evidence that the agreement is integrated, a court may overlook it
on grounds of bad faith, unconscionability, or, like Admiral Nel-
son, by turning a blind eye to it.22 If a court recognizes the repre-
sentation as part of the agreement, it can be enforced against the
seller.
2. Interpretation
A litigant may always offer parol evidence to resolve a ques-
tion of interpretation. For example, in Leveridge v. Notaras,23 the
written agreement contained this printed clause:
It is understood that I have examined said motor car and accept
it in its present condition and agree that there are no warranties
or representations, expressed or implied, not specified herein, re-
specting the goods hereby ordered.24
20. Another significant exception, the admission of evidence of custom and usage,
rarely applies to a consumer purchase.
21. A sample merger clause reads as follows:
MERGER CLAUSE. The seller's salesmen may have made oral statements about
the merchandise described in this contract. Such statements do not constitute
warranties, shall not be relied on by the buyer, and are not part of the contract for
sale. The entire contract is embodied in this writing. This writing constitutes the
final expression of the parties' agreement, and it is a complete and exclusive state-
ment of the terms of that agreement.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
12-4 at 437 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
22. 1 A. CORBIN, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT
LAW § 128 (1964) states:
Courts have often avoided the enforcement of unconscionable provisions in long
printed standardized contracts, in part by the process of "interpretation" against
the party using them, and in part by the method used by Lord Nelson at
Copenhagen.
12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 949 (15th ed. 1977) explains the reference to Nelson's method:
"The Danes resisted bravely, and Parker, fearing that Nelson was suffering unacceptable
losses, hoisted the signal to disengage. Nelson disregarded it, delivering his famous quip, 'I
have only one eye-I have a right to be blind sometimes.'"
23. 433 P.2d 935 (Okla. 1967).
24. Id. at 937.
1986] 277
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The agreement also contained this handwritten notation:
30 day warranty
Repair clutch as needed
not too exceed $100.00
Date no later then Sat.
Feb. 24, 1963.25
The purchaser attempted to prove that the handwritten notation
evidenced an oral warranty. The seller objected that the pur-
chaser's tender of proof was barred by a merger clause that
provided:
It is agreed that no change, alteration, interlineation, or verbal
agreement of any kind shall be effective to change alter or amend
the printed terms of this agreement26
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's admission of parol ev-
idence. The handwritten notation, which apparently created a war-
ranty, conflicted with the printed form, which denied any warran-
ties. Therefore, parol evidence was properly admissible to interpret
the document. The court found a warranty and enforced it against
the seller.27
3. Formation
The rule does not bar evidence offered to prove that no agree-
ment was formed, such as proof that the purchaser's assent was
lacking due to fraud or mistake.2 8 One of the elements of a con-
tract is consent of the parties. When the consent of one party is
obtained by fraud, that apparent consent is not given freely.29 In
that event, the party whose consent was fraudulently obtained may
rescind the contract.8" For example, in Ed Fine Oldsmobile, Inc. v.
Knisley,s1 the parol evidence rule did not bar the purchaser from
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 940-41.
28. While mistake is also grounds for avoiding a contract, there are no reported cases
in which a used car purchaser successfully used the claim. It may be difficult for the pur-
chaser to prove that the mistake was mutual and not unilateral. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1982). Furthermore, the purchaser may have assumed the risk of mis-
take by accepting the car "as is." See, e.g., Lenawee County Board of Health v. Messerly,
417 Mich. 17, 331 N.W.2d 203 (1982).
29. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-301(1), -401(1)(c) (1985).
30. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-1711(1) (1985).
31. 319 A.2d 33 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974). See also Jeffers v. Brown Motor Co., 253 Ark.
1084, 490 S.W.2d 803 (1973) (error by trial court to strike purchaser's counterclaims alleging
representations made by seller, even though the allegations were inconsistent with the terms
of the contract); Neil Huffman Volkswagen Corp. v. Ridolphi, 378 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 1979)
[Vol. 47
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introducing evidence that the dealer knowingly misrepresented the
condition of the vehicle.
The sale of a car is a UCC transaction, subject to the expres-
sion of the parol evidence rule in the UCC.32 Although the UCC
does not expressly codify the fraud exception to the parol evidence
rule, it preserves supplementary general principles of law and eq-
uity.s" As a general principle of law, an agreement is not formed
when, due to fraud, consent is not freely given.3 4 Under the UCC,
courts have continued to disregard merger clauses when fraud is
alleged. For example, in City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner,3 5 the Su-
preme Court of Georgia held that "neither the draftsmen nor the
legislature intended to erase the tort remedy for fraud and deceit
with the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code . . .-.
B. Fraud
A used car purchaser who overcomes the obstacle of the parol
evidence rule and uses the seller's representations to prove com-
mon law fraud may seek damages in tort or may seek to avoid the
contract. In making a claim for fraud, the plaintiff must prove the
following elements: (1) a representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its mate-
riality, (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity, or ignorance of its
truth, (5) the speaker's intent that it should be acted upon by the
person and in the manner reasonably contemplated, (6) the
hearer's ignorance of its falsity, (7) the hearer's reliance upon its
truth, (8) the hearer's right to rely upon it, and (9) the hearer's
consequent and proximate injury.3 7 Used car purchasers encounter
the most difficulty proving that the representation is a statement
of fact and proving that their reliance on the representation is
reasonable.
Even a purchaser who can overcome the hurdle of the parol
evidence rule may have difficulty proving that the seller made a
misrepresentation of fact as opposed to opinion or sales "puffing."
Whether particular language constitutes speculation, opinion, or
averment of fact depends on all the attending facts and circum-
(dealer liable in fraud for failing to disclose $2,000 in major defects after representing car
was in good condition with only minor damage).
32. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-202 (1985), supra note 11.
33. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-103 (1985). See Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 1059 (1976).
34. See supra, note 29.
35. 232 Ga. 769, 208 S.E.2d 794 (1974).
36. Id. at 769, 208 S.E.2d at 797.
37. United States v. Willard E. Fraser Co., 308 F. Supp. 557, 569-70 (D.C. Mont.
1970). The elements of deceit found in MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-712 (1985) are virtually the
same as the elements of actual fraud found in MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-405 (1985).
19861
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stances of a case. For example, one court held that a dealer's repre-
sentation that a used car was "in good .condition and suitable for
driving" was merely puffing and a statement of opinion. 38 Another
held that statements that a car had never been wrecked"e or had
been driven a certain number of miles 0 were representations of
fact.
The other main obstacle for purchasers is proving that their
reliance was reasonable. Many courts have held that reliance upon
representations, however false, is unreasonable where the pur-
chaser had investigated, or had the means at hand to investigate
the truth.4 For example, in Williams v. Rank & Sons Buick,
Inc., 2 a salesman represented that the car was equipped with air
conditioning. The purchaser inspected the car on the lot and took
it on a test drive for about an hour and a half. The court held that
the purchaser's reliance on the representation was unreasonable
when he had an adequate opportunity to discover its falsity.43
C. Negligence
In the classic case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,44 the
New York Court of Appeals held the manufacturer of an automo-
bile liable for negligence in spite of the lack of privity between the
manufacturer and the consumer. The general rule now finds ex-
pression in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manu-
facture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recog-
nize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to
those who use it for a purpose for which the manufacturer should
expect it to be used and to those whom he should expect to be
endangered by its probable use, is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a pur-
pose for which it is supplied."3
The RESTATEMENT rule also applies "where the only harm which
results from the manufacturer's failure to exercise reasonable care
is to the manufactured chattel itself. '46
38. Randall v. Smith, 136 Ga. App. 823, 222 S.E.2d 664 (1975).
39. City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 208 S.E.2d 794 (1974).
40. Gem City Motors, Inc. v. Minton, 109 Ga. App. 842, 137 S.E.2d 522 (1964).
41. Willard E. Fraser Co., 308 F. Supp. at 569-70.
42. 44 Wis. 2d 239, 170 N.W.2d 807 (1969).
43. Id. at 246-47, 170 N.W.2d at 811.
44. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965).
46. Id., comment n.
[Vol. 47
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A used car dealer may be liable to a purchaser on a negligence
theory if the purchaser can show that (1) the dealer breached a
duty, (2) the car was defective, and (3) the defect was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. A used car dealer generally owes a pur-
chaser a duty to discover and repair defects that are patent,
known, or discoverable in the exercise of reasonable care.'" In juris-
dictions that do not impose safety standards by statute, the duty
may be imposed as a matter of law.
In Kopischke v. First Continental Corp.,'s the purchaser of a
used car was severely injured when the car went out of control due
to defects in the steering mechanism. The seller maintained that
the purchaser's acceptance of the car "as is" barred her claim.4e
The Montana Supreme Court held that a used car dealer has a
duty to discover and repair any defects which are patent or discov-
erable in the exercise of ordinary care. The duty to inspect does
not necessitate dismantling the car, however. A dealer who neglects
the duty to discover and repair defects is liable for personal inju-
ries resulting from its negligent failure to inspect. The "as is" dis-
claimer does not relieve the dealer of this liability.
An attorney pursuing a tort claim against the seller of a defec-
tive used car must distinguish between those defects that make the
product dangerous and those that merely make it inferior. The for-
mer may lead to personal injuries while the latter generally lead
only to economic loss. The court did-not decide in Kopischke
whether the dealer would be responsible for economic loss, such as
the cost of repair, in the absence of personal injury. The imposi-
tion of a duty to inspect and repair, however, was based on the
public policy interest in ensuring that used cars are safe." To fur-
ther this interest, the law should require sellers to repair any de-
fect affecting safety, for a seller does not know at the time of sale
whether a defect will later cause injury. In a claim against a dealer
for defects in a used car, the purchaser should emphasize any dan-
gerous condition that results from the defect.
A purchaser who can demonstrate that the dealer owed the
purchaser a duty may have difficulty proving that a car was defec-
tive on delivery.5 The previous owner may be a source of informa-
tion. Also, the dealer may have attempted to remedy the defect
47. See, e.g., Hembree v. Southard, 339 P.2d 771 (Okla. 1959).
48. 187 Mont. 471, 610 P.2d 668 (1980).
49. The contract provided: "All used cars are sold on an as is basis with no guarantee
either express or implied except as noted above." Id. at 474, 610 P.2d at 670.
50. Id. at 491-92, 610 P.2d at 679.
51. A guide and checklist for proving that loss resulted from the sale of a defective
used car is found at Annot., 31 POF2d 639, 696 (1982).
1986]
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prior to sale. Because the difficulty of proving negligence was one
of the factors that led to the doctrine of strict liability, a purchaser
who is unable to prove negligence on the part of a manufacturer or
dealer should consider a claim in strict liability in tort.5s
D. Conclusion
When a party recovers in tort for deceit, the court generally
awards compensatory damages, which restore that party to the
pre-transaction position.5 3 In addition, the court may award puni-
tive damages when the defendant has been guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice. When a party recovers in contract for fraud, the
court generally awards rescission of the contract."
Whether recovery is in tort or contract, the prevailing party
does not recover transaction costs, the most significant of which is
attorneys' fees. Under the "American Rule" each side pays its own
fees, win or lose.56 In litigation concerning a used car, the transac-
tion costs can easily exceed the potential recovery, making the
claim economically unreasonable.5 7 A purchaser may resolve this
problem by bringing the claim in a small claims court, where the
transaction costs are lower. On the other hand, the court's ceiling
on recovery may be lower than the damages. An attorney can play
an important role behind the scenes by advising the client how to
present the case in a professional manner. Before doing so, how-
ever, the attorney should consider the many claims for relief other
than common law claims. These claims may be easier to prove and
may provide for attorneys' fees.
III. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Introduction
When a purchaser claims that a used car does not perform as
promised, the purchaser must first establish what the dealer prom-
ised. The promises, or warranties, have two sources: express war-
ranties found in the agreement of the parties and implied warran-
ties imposed by operation of law. A claim for breach of express
warranty must demonstrate that: (1) seller made an affirmation of
52. See infra Part VII.B.
53. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-202 (1985).
54. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1985).
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-1711(1) (1985).
56. See Comment, "... And Attorney Fees to the Prevailing Party": Recovering At-
torney Fees Under Montana Statutory Law, 46 MONT. L. REV. 119 (1985).
57. This fact probably accounts for the relative paucity of used car cases in the report-
ers compared to the scope of the problem.
282 [Vol. 47
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fact or promise, (2) the goods did not comply with the warranty,
(3) plaintiff's injury was caused by the defective nature of the
goods, and (4) plaintiff was damaged. A claim for breach of implied
warranty would simply allege that: (1) a merchant sold the goods
and (2) the goods were not merchantable. 8
B. Express Warranties
1. Is the Representation Part of the Contract?
A seller creates an express warranty by making an affirmation
of fact, describing the goods, or showing a sample or model as
"part of the basis of the bargain." 59 In other words, the express
warranty must be contained in the contract. To establish the exis-
tence of express warranties, therefore, a court must first determine
the agreement of the parties. Purchasers alert to this problem
should insist that any representations be written into the
agreement.6
While express warranties contained in a written instrument
signed by the parties present few problems, in many cases a pur-
chaser will claim that the dealer made oral representations which
were not reduced to writing. In contrast to the purchaser who
claims fraud, 61 this purchaser asks the court not to avoid the con-
tract, but to enforce the oral representations as part of the con-
tract. The considerations examined earlier in connection with parol
evidence in common law claims are equally applicable to determine
whether the representations are admissible in warranty claims.2
2. Do the Words Create an Express Warranty?
After applying the parol evidence rule to determine the par-
ties' agreement, a court may examine whether the purchaser has a
claim for breach of the express warranties contained in that agree-
ment. The UCC provides that "any affirmation of fact or promise
made by the seller to the buyer . . . creates an express war-
ranty. . . ."6 As when alleging fraud," the purchaser must prove
that a seller's statement is an affirmation of fact rather than an
58. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, SALES OF GOODS AND SERVICES §§ 5.2, 6.2 (1982).
59. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-313 (1985).
60. The failure of purchasers to protect themselves in this manner was the force be-
hind the FTC Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule. See infra Part IV.
61. See supra Part II.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 16-31.
63. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-313(1)(a) (1985).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
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opinion.5
Whether a statement will be treated as an express warranty or
as "puffing" is a question of fact that is not easily resolved. Gener-
ally, a representation which expresses the seller's opinion, belief,
judgment or estimate does not constitute an express warranty."6
For example, a statement that "this car gets great gas mileage" is
probably an opinion, while a statement that "this car gets not less
than 25 mpg in highway driving" is probably an affirmation of fact.
The difference is not always readily apparent. One court found
that a used car dealer's representations that the car was in "A-1
shape" and "mechanically perfect" were affirmations of fact.6 7 An-
other found that the seller's representations that the car was "in
good condition" 'and "suitable for driving" were sales "puffing." 6 8
To invoke an old chestnut, resolution of this issue depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. 9
Another issue involves the extent to which an express war-
ranty may be created by a mere description of the goods. For ex-
ample, a seller markets a used car as a "1982 Buick" and effec-
tively excludes all warranties. The seller is undoubtedly liable for
breach of warranty if the goods do not conform to the description;
for example, the car is in fact a 1981 Chevrolet.70 The seller has
also promised a car. Does the seller thereby warrant that the goods
will not only conform to the literal description, "1982 Buick," but
that the goods will meet a minimal standard of performance as a
"car?" In short, is a seller liable for breach of an express warranty
if a used car does not run?
Surprisingly few decisions discuss this issue.71 In Meyer v.
65. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-313(2) (1985) provides that "an affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commenda-
tion of the goods does not create a warranty."
66. Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc., 173 Mont. 345, 567 P.2d 916 (1977). See also Garriffa
v. Taylor, 675 P.2,d 1284 (Wyo. 1984); Parker v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 10 Ill. App. 1000, 295
N.E.2d 487 (1973).
67. Wat Henry Pontiac v. Bradley, 202 Okla. 82, 210 P.2d 348 (1949).
68. Randall v. Smith, 136 Ga. App. 823, 22 S.E.2d 664 (1975).
69. For example, WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 21, § 9-3 observes that the holding in
Wat Henry is illuminated by the fact that the purchaser bought the car to make a trip with
her seven-month old child to visit her husband, who was serving in the army during World
War II.
70. The hypothetical suggests the complex case of the Oldsmobiles sold with Chevrolet
engines. See In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979). Claims were brought on various grounds and
settled before the court made findings. In a related case, Skelton v. General Motors Corp.,
660 F.2d 311 (1981), the trial court held that the engine switch did not constitute a breach
of implied warranty, but did constitute a deceptive warranty under Magnuson-Moss. Id. at
313 n.1. See infra text accompanying notes 139-42.
71. British Commonwealth cases are collected and discussed in Whincup, Reasonable
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Packard Cleveland Motor Co.,72 a pre-UCC case, the Ohio Su-
preme Court held that a "dump truck" sold with no other express
warranties, does not mean "a shape of 5-ton size, but a thing fitted
for practical, useful, substantial service as a dump truck." And in
Crowther v. Shannon Motor Co.,73 an English court held that the
seller was responsible for repairs to an eight-year old Jaguar sold
with 80,000 miles on it that broke down after 2300 miles. The ap-
peals court approved of the reasoning of the trial judge, who had
asked, "What does 'fit for the purpose' mean?" He had answered
his own question, "To go as a car for a reasonable time. '7 4
The reasoning of these cases makes sense. When sold as trans-
portation, a car should possess the ability to perform as a car. But
how much performance is the purchaser of a particular used car
entitled to? This appears to be an unusually abstruse inquiry for a
court to undertake. 5 Yet courts often seek to establish the level of
performance necessary to meet the standard of "merchantability"
under the implied warranty of merchantability. 6 By pursuing a
similar inquiry when the seller markets a "car" as transportation,
courts could establish a minimal level of performance in all car
sales.7 7 This inquiry would be especially pertinent when, as is usu-
ally the case, the seller excludes implied warranties, leaving the
purchaser a claim only for breach of an express warranty.78
3. Was the Warranty Part of the Basis of the Bargain?
Assume that a purchaser can prove that an express warranty
was made and incorporated in the agreement. To recover for
breach of warranty, must the purchaser demonstrate reliance on
the representation? This issue is unresolved. The UCC does not
employ the term reliance. Instead, it asks whether the affirmation
is "part of the basis of the bargain." In Cagney v. Cohn,7 9 the seller
told the purchaser that a motorcycle was "in good cdndition" and
"needed no major repairs." The court held that these statements
Fitness of Cars, 38 MOD. L. REV. 660 (1975).
72. 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922).
73. [1975] 1 All E.R. 139 (C.A.).
74. Id. at 141.
75. The idea that things may be viewed in terms of their actuality and potentiality is
found in Aristotle's PHYSics Book II ch. 3 and METAPHYSicS Book IX chs. 5-9. Judges might
be said to be asking how much "carness" a purchaser can expect.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 94-99.
77. Part VIII infra addresses statutory mechanisms that could be used to establish
this floor, such as requiring the seller to meet state safety inspection requirements in the
sale of used cars.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 108-22.
79. 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 998 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973).
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constituted express warranties. 80 The seller then claimed that the
purchaser, who twice inspected the motorcycle and conferred with
an expert, did not rely on the representations. The court held that
reliance was unnecessary, citing the UCC Official Comments, which
presume that any affirmation is part of the basis of the bargain,
and state that "no particular reliance on such statements need be
shown." 81 Nevertheless, some commentators suggest that a careful
lawyer should allege reliance.82
Sometimes litigation raises the issue of whether statements
made in an advertisement are part of the basis of the bargain.
Most courts hold that statements made in an advertisement can be
part of the bargain if the purchaser was aware of the advertise-
ment.83 A purchaser can make a stronger case if the purchaser can
also demonstrate reliance on the statements in the advertise-
ment.8 4 In Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc.,8" the Montana Supreme
Court stated:
The law appears to be well settled that a remote manufacturer
without privity with the purchaser is liable for breach of warranty
by advertising on radio and television, in newspapers and
magazines, and in brochures made available to prospective pur-
chasers, if the purchaser relies on them to his detriment."s
While the court viewed expansively the sources from which express
warranties may arise, it may have restricted the usefulness of those
warranties to purchasers by requiring reliance. The court also ne-
glected to state whether the agreement contained a merger clause,
for a purchaser could not assert warranties that were expressly ex-
cluded from the bargain. 87
C. Implied Warranties
Of the warranties implied by law,88 the most significant in the
80. Id. at 1003.
81. Id. at 1005-06.
82. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-313 annot. Official Comment 3 (1985), states that "no
particular reliance on such statements need be shown. ... White and Summers suggest
that the purchaser show reliance. They conclude that while the cases are divided, courts are
reluctant to give up the reliance requirement. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 21, § 9-4.
83. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 21, § 9-4.
84. See, e.g., Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. App. 1976). See
also Palmer, Express Warranties Arising From Advertising, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 497 (1975).
85. 173 Mont. 345, 567 P.2d 916 (1977).
86. Id. at 353, 567 P.2d at 921.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
88. The warranty of title, MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-312 (1985), is not relevant to this
article. The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-315 (1985),
is rarely given in a used car transaction. In Society Nat'l Bank v. Pemberton, 63 Ohio Misc.
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purchase of a used car is the warranty of merchantability.89 In this
section, the UCC distinguishes between commercial transactions
and consumer transactions. It provides that only a merchant seller
gives a warranty of merchantability. The warranty does not arise,
therefore, when a purchaser buys a vehicle from a private party
rather than from a dealer.90
Most litigation under the statute concerns the meaning of
merchantability. Of the numerous definitions in the statute, the
one most applicable to used car sales is that the goods must be "fit
for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. . . ."91 It
is well-settled that a warranty of merchantability arises in the sale
of used goods, although the issue is often litigated.2 Applying the
definition to used goods is particularly difficult, however, for the
condition of each unit makes it unique. The Official Comments to
the UCC state in part: "A contract for the sale of second-hand
goods, however, involves only such obligation as is appropriate to
such goods for that is their contract description." 9 In other words,
a purchaser can not expect a used car to be as fit as a new car of
the same model, nor a used car with 50,000 miles as fit as a used
car of the same model with 25,000 miles.
We have again reached the point of attempting to define the
level of performance a used car purchaser may expect, a discussion
begun with the express warranty.9" It was there propounded that
when a seller markets a unit as a "car," the seller warrants that the
unit will meet a minimal level of performance as an automobile,
analogous to the level required by the implied warranty of
merchantability.
In the absence of some other stated purpose, it seems fair to
presume that the purchaser of a used car intends to use it for basic
transportation. The UCC suggests that the level of performance a
26, 17 Ohio Ops. 3d 342, 409 N.E.2d 1073 (1979), the representation that a vehicle was
suitable for snow plowing was treated as an express warranty.
89. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-314(1) (1985) provides:
IMPLIED WARRANTY-MERCHANTABILITY-USAGE OF TRADE. (1) Unless excluded
or modified (30-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied
in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
90. Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 998, 1007 n.10 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1973). The court was careful to note that the seller's lay status did not exempt him from
express warranties created under § 2-313. Id. at 1003.
91. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-314(2)(c) (1985).
92. See Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1387 (1968); Whittle v. Timesavers, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 115
(W.D. Va. 1985).
93. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-314 annot. Official Comment 3 (1985).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 70-78.
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purchaser can expect may be answered by the simple adage: you
get what you pay for.' 5 Accordingly, a car sold by the ton is pre-
sumably fit only for scrap. And a car selling for half its "Blue
Book" 6 value presumably will not perform as well as one selling
for its Blue Book price. Wrestling with this issue in Testo v. Russ
Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc.,97 the Court of Appeals of Washington
stated:
The obligation appropriate to the sale of used goods is primarily
directed at the operative essentials of the product. Thus, the mea-
sure of a used car's merchantability turns not so much on aes-
thetic items which, of necessity, must yield to age and previous
use, but on its operative qualities. The price at which a merchant
is willing to sell an item is an excellent index of the extent of
quality warranted and the nature and scope of his obligation. To
be fit for the purpose of ordinary driving, a 4-year-old automo-
bile, selling for $2,697 in 1973, must be in reasonably safe condi-
tion and substantially free of defects which render it inoperable.
It also must be a "used car" and not a vehicle substantially modi-
fied for racing purposes and extensively used as such."
According to this analysis of the expected level of performance
of a used car, if a purchaser pays a premium price, the standard of
merchantability is high, and vice-versa. The analysis, however, pre-
supposes equal knowledge among the parties. It may therefore be
applicable to deals between merchants, where each party has rela-
tively equal knowledge, but not to deals between a knowledgeable
merchant and a less knowledgeable consumer. Furthermore, it may
be useful in resolving a case after the car has broken down, when a
court must decide whether the purchaser assumed the risk of de-
fects. It is less helpful at the point of purchase, when the price may
not be directly related to the level of performance. In the absence
of an obligation to disclose, freedom of contract surely permits a
seller to exact the highest price possible, irrespective of the condi-
tion of the automobile. Similarly, rational economic behavior may
lead a purchaser to shop for the lowest price, irrespective of the
fact that the low price may reflect a substantially defective car.
The expected level of performance, then, should not be related
95. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-314 annot. Official Comment 7 (1985) makes the point
more elegantly: "In cases of doubt as to what quality is intended, the price at which a
merchant closes a contract is an excellent index of the nature and scope of his obligation
under the present section."
96. The Blue Book is the official used car pricing guide of the National Automobile
Dealers' Association.
97. 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976).
98. Id. at 43.44, 554 P.2d at 354.
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to price, for there is not necessarily a direct relationship between
price and quality. Price is rationally related to quality only if de-
fects are disclosed. When defects are not disclosed, the extra cost
of repairing those defects is effectively added to the price. The
level of performance then, should be a function of disclosure.
When disclosure is made, the level the purchaser can expect is
freely bargained for. When disclosure is not made, the level the
purchaser can expect is the price less the cost of repairing the de-
fects. In this analysis, the expected level of performance would be,
as the English judge put it, "to go as a car for a reasonable time." 99
While purchasers may reasonably expect used cars to operate
as cars, they should understand that sellers are not guarantors of
continued performance. An implied warranty promises only that
the goods are not defective at delivery. Unless otherwise worded,
an implied warranty does not promise that the seller is responsible
for future problems. 00 Many purchasers' cases have failed because
of their inability to prove that the car was defective when
purchased.101
For example, in Rose v. Epley Motor Sales,'0 three hours af-
ter purchase, the engine of a used car caught fire, destroying the
car. The trial court, finding an implied warranty of fitness in the
sale that was not disclaimed in writing or by the purchaser's in-
spection, granted rescission.'03 The Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina reversed, holding that although the purchaser's testimony cre-
ated an inference that the defect that caused the fire existed at the
time of sale, the cause of the fire was a question of fact precluding
a directed verdict.10 4
To prove the existence of a defect at the time of sale, a pur-
chaser should obtain the opinion of an expert immediately after
the breakdown. 10 5 It may be possible to discover the repair records
99. Crowther, 1 All E.R. at 141. The Attorney General's Motor Vehicle Regulations,
MAss. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 940 (1980), similarly provides: "All vehicles. . . must be fit to
be driven safely on the roads and must remain in good running condition for a reasonable
period of time."
100. For example, warranties stating that "seller warrants that this car will run well
for 30 days" or "seller warrants that it will repair any powertrain components for the next
60 days," would cover problems that arise during the stated period.
101. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-607(4) (1985) provides: "The burden is on the buyer to
establish any breach with respect to the goods accepted." See, e.g., Walsh v. Atamian Mo-
tors, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 828, 406 N.E.2d 733 (1980); Entrialgo v. Twin City Dodge, Inc., 368
Mass. 812, 333 N.E.2d 202 (1975).
102. 288 N.C. 53, 215 S.E.2d 573 (1975).
103. Id. at 60-61, 215 S.E.2d at 577-78.
104. Id. at 61-62, 215 S.E.2d at 578.
105. See, e.g., Calimlim v. Foreign Car Center, Inc., 392 Mass. 228, 467 N.E.2d 443
(1984). Cf. Atamian Motors, Inc., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 828, 406 N.E.2d 733.
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or procedures of the seller. 10 Some jurisdictions require that the
seller reveal to the purchaser the name of the previous owner."0 7
With this information, the purchaser can establish a link between
the defective car in the hands of the seller and the breakdown.
D. Exclusion of Warranties
Consideration of warranties must be tempered by the fact that
the seller of a used car often disclaims the warranties. 108 The UCC
permits a seller to disclaim warranties, either with particularity or
simply by including the expression "as is" or its equivalent in the
agreement. 0 9
Only with difficulty may a seller exclude express warranties,
however, for a contradiction arises when the seller both makes and
disclaims express warranties. To resolve the contradiction, a court
106. E.g., Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 610 P.2d 668 (1980).
107. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.01(7a)(b) (West 1982).
108. A sample disclaimer reads as follows:
EXCLUSIONS OF WARRANTIES: The parties agree that the implied warran-
ties of MERCHANTABILITY and fitness for a particular purpose and all other
warranties, express or implied, are EXCLUDED from this transaction and shall
not apply to the goods sold.
WHITE & SuMMERs, supra note 21, § 12-5 at 440.
109. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316 (1985) provides:
EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF WARRANTIES.
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this
chapter on parol or extrinsic evidence (30-2-202) negation or limitation is inopera-
tive to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and
in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied
warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language
to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example,
that 'There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face
hereof.'
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2):
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are ex-
cluded by expressions like 'as is', 'with all faults' or other language which in com-
mon understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and
makes plain that there is no impled warranty;
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods
or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods
there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in
the circumstances to have revealed to him;
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contrac-
tual modification of remedy (30-2-718 and 30-2-719).
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may give effect to the express warranty. 1 0 For example, if a seller
markets a 1982 Buick Skylark "as is," the seller has used language
("as is") that effectively disclaims express and implied warranties.
Nevertheless, the purchaser has obtained warranties that the vehi-
cle will conform to the description ("1982 Buick Skylark") and ar-
guably, that it will perform as a car. In Society National Bank v.
Pemberton,"' the seller told the purchaser, prior to the purchase,
that the vehicle was suitable for snow plowing. The written agree-
ment contained a disclaimer of warranties. The court held that
while the disclaimer effectively excluded implied warranties, it
failed to exclude an express warranty that was part of the basis of
the bargain.11 2 Similarly, in Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc.,"a the
Montana Supreme Court stated:
Even if the Farmhand disclaimer had been made prior to the sale,
such disclaimer would not have been effective to destroy the ex-
press warranties made in the brochure and by Bick [the dealer].
In 1 Anderson Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-316:28, p. 698, it is
stated:
"When there is a conflict between a specific express war-
ranty and a clause which in general language excludes all
warranties, the specific warranty provision prevails."'1 "
While the reasoning of these courts is correct on the issue of con-
tradictory warranties, they overlook the preliminary issue of
whether the written agreement contained a merger clause. If the
agreement did contain a merger clause, the courts neglected to an-
alyze whether evidence of the oral representation was admissible
under the parol evidence rule. 16 It may be that the courts' neglect
was intentional.1 16
Even when the seller has not disclaimed implied warranties,
the purchaser's failure to examine the goods may have the effect of
110. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316(1) (1985).
111. 63 Ohio Misc. 26, 17 Ohio Ops. 3d 342, 409 N.E.2d 1073 (1979).
112. Id. at 29-30, 17 Ohio Ops. 3d at - , 409 N.E.2d at 1076-77.
113. 173 Mont. 345, 567 P.2d 916 (1977).
114. 173 Mont. 345, 355, 567 P.2d 916, 921-22. In Schlenz v. John Deere Co., 511 F.
Supp. 224, 228 (D.C. Mont. 1981), the court cited Whitaker in finding the seller's disclaimer
of express warranties ineffective to destroy an express warranty contained in an owner's
manual.
115. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316 annot. Official Comment 3 (1985) provides:
The seller is protected under this Article against false allegations of oral warran-
ties by its provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence and against unauthorized
representations by the customary "lack of authority" clauses.
It might be noted that the seller is protected against true allegations as well. See supra text
accompanying notes 59-62.
116. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 21, § 2-12 at 91-95. See also supra note 22.
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a disclaimer. The UCC provides that where a purchaser has ex-
amined the goods, there is no implied warranty with regard to de-
fects which the purchaser ought to have noticed. 17 Although this
provision produces the equivalent of an "as is" sale, courts seldom
apply it to used car sales, for they do not expect purchasers to be
capable of noticing mechanical defects." 8
Although the UCC does not require the "as is" disclaimer to
be conspicuous,119 many courts have read in this requirement."s" A
court can also set aside an exclusion that appears to be unfair. The
statute permitting the exclusion of warranties by expressions like
''as is" contains the prefatory language "unless the circumstances
indicate otherwise ... "2 Situations in which the notice is im-
posed on an unwary purchaser, particularly after contrary repre-
sentations are made, may supply such circumstances. 1 2
E. Magnuson-Moss
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act (Magnuson-Moss) 123 applies only to warrantors
of consumer products.124 The act makes few substantive changes in
warranty law. It does not require a seller 125 to give a warranty, but
a seller who does give a warranty must make certain disclosures.2 '
The seller must designate the warranty as either "full" or "lim-
ited. ' 127 A warrantor who gives a full warranty may not disclaim or
117. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316(3)(b) (1985).
118. For example, in Rose v. Epley Motor Sales, 288 N.C. 59, 215 S.E.2d 573 (1975),
the court held that a purchaser who lacked mechanical expertise was not required to dis-
cover a defect through a test drive or inspection.
119. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316(3) (1985). Cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316(2) (1985),
which requires that the particular written disclaimer of the implied warranties of
merchantability or fitness be conspicuous.
120. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 21, § 12-6 at 450.
121. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316(3)(a) (1985).
122. See, e.g., Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). These
circumstances are less likely to arise under the FTC Used Car Trade Regulation Rule, how-
ever, for the rule requires the seller to clearly present the disclaimer. See infra Part IV.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (1982).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (1982) provides:
The term "consumer product" means any tangible personal property which is dis-
tributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes (including any such property intended to be attached to or installed
in any real property without regard to whether it is so attached or installed).
125. The statute is applicable to a "supplier," which is defined as "any person engaged
in the business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers."
15 U.S.C. § 2301(4) (1982). The term "seller" is used here in the context of the supplier of a
used car.
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302-04 (1982).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 2303 (1982).
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limit the duration of the implied warranty of merchantability.1 2 8
While Magnuson-Moss gives consumers a federal claim for re-
lief for breach of warranty, a warranty for purposes of the UCC
may not be a warranty for purposes of Magnuson-Moss."' 9 For ex-
ample, a promise that "If for any reason you are dissatisfied with
this product, you may return it for a refund of your money," is a
UCC warranty but not a Magnuson-Moss warranty, for it neither
promises that the goods are free of defects nor contains any time
period. An oral promise that "If anything goes wrong with the car
in the next 30 days, we will fix it," is a UCC warranty but not a
Magnuson-Moss warranty, for it is not written. A used car seller's
written promise to repair defects for 30 days on a 50-50 cost basis
is a Magnuson-Moss warranty, for it promises that the car will
meet a specified level of performance (no defects) over a specified
period of time (30 days).
While used car sellers rarely give full warranties, they often
give limited warranties such as the preceding example.' 0 The giv-
ing of a Magnuson-Moss warranty not only triggers the act's dis-
closure provisions'3 ' but also bars disclaimer of the implied war-
ranties given by state law, that is, by the UCC. The seller may,
however, limit the implied warranty to the duration of a written
warranty of reasonable duration.' 32 The requirement that sellers
may not disclaim implied warranties may be significant for used
car purchasers. For example, no longer may a seller give a 30-day
express warranty and state, "This warranty is in lieu of all other
128. 15 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982).
129. "Written warranty" is a term of art under Magnuson-Moss. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)
(1982) provides:
The term "written warranty" means-
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection
with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the
nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material
or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a
specified period of time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a
consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with
respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifica-
tions set forth in the undertaking, which written affirmation, promise, or under-
taking becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for
purposes other than resale of such product.
130. See FTC Statement, supra note 4.
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302-04 (1982). Section 2303 requires the warrantor to designate the
warranty as either "full" or "limited." In order to qualify as a full warranty, the warranty
must meet minimum standards set forth in § 2304. Because the warranty cited in the text
requires the consumer to incur costs, the seller would have to designate it a limited
warranty.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1982).
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warranties, express or implied." By law, the goods must be
merchantable.
On the other hand, the limitation of duration of that implied
warranty may not be meaningful. An implied warranty means that
the goods are merchantable at the time of delivery. The "duration"
of an implied warranty, such as 30 days, is an alien concept under
the UCC. Possible interpretations of the duration requirement are
that it refers to the time during which the purchaser must notify
the seller of the defect, or that it operates as a presumption that
the defect existed at the time of delivery. 3 ' If it refers to a statute
of limitations, then the time would be unreasonably short.1s'
A violation of Magnuson-Moss constitutes a violation of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act. 135 While the FTC Act does
not allow private actions, a consumer could bring an action under
the state Consumer Protection Act. 30 Furthermore, Magnuson-
Moss permits consumers damaged by a violation of the act to bring
private actions. The act provides:
Subject to subsections (a)(3) and (e), a consumer who is dam-
aged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor
to comply with any obligation under this title, or under a written
warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit
for damages and other legal and equitable relief- 17
The statutory language permitting a consumer to recover against a
seller who fails "to comply with any obligation under this title"
applies to violations of Magnuson-Moss. But the recovery for fail-
ure to comply with any obligation "under a written warranty, im-
plied warranty, or service contract" is ambiguous. Does the act
permit a consumer to bring an action for breach of any written
warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, or an action only
for breach of an obligation imposed by the act? The former inter-
pretation would permit a consumer to convert any UCC warranty
claim into a Magnuson-Moss action. A successful consumer could
thereby recover costs and attorneys' fees, which are expressly per-
mitted in a Magnuson-Moss action 38 but not in a UCC action.
133. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, SALES OF GOODS AND SERVICES § 26.3.1 (1982 &
Supp. 1985).
134. See Schroeder, Private Actions under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 66 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1978).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(b) (1982).
136. See infra Part V.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1982).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (1982) provides:
(2) If a consumer finally prevails in any action brought under paragraph (1) of
this subsection, he may be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment
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This problem was analyzed in Skelton v. General Motors.' 9
Chevrolet represented that certain automobiles contained THM
350 transmissions; in fact, the transmissions were model THM 200.
The trial court found that the representation was not a Magnuson-
Moss "written warranty." Even though the statement was included
in a document that contained the required Magnuson-Moss disclo-
sures, it was merely a description of the goods. While this creates a
warranty under the UCC, ' 0 Magnuson-Moss requires that a "writ-
ten warranty" affirm that a product will "meet a specified level of
performance over a specified period of time."'4 The Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed. 4"
The court also held that, based on the legislative history,
Magnuson-Moss did not create a private cause of action for breach
of all written express warranties.' 43 The court, however, rejected
the trial court's finding that the act permitted a private cause of
action when the warrantor makes "other written promises in con-
nection with the same transaction. . . .",4 The majority held '"
that the term "written warranty" in the damages provision of the
act146 must be interpreted in accordance with the term "written
warranty" in the definitions. 147 A dissenting judge stated that the
representations were incorporated in the written warranty. He con-
cluded, "[tjhe written warranty would then more fully deserve its
gold filigree frame.""14
a sum equal to the aggregate amount of cost and expenses (including attorneys'
fees based on actual time expended) determined by the court to have been reason-
ably incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and
prosecution of such action, unless the court in its discretion shall determine that
such an award of attorneys' fees would be inappropriate.
139. 660 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1981).
140. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-313(b) (1985).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (1982).
142. Skelton, 660 F.2d at 316 n.7. The court stated:
The district court noted that, by this reading of [Magnuson-Moss], a repre-
sentation that a "transmission would perform like a THM 350 transmission for
the life of the transmission" would constitute a "written warranty," while the rep-
resentation that a "transmission would perform like a THM 350 transmission"
does not. The arbitrariness of this distinction is apparent, but a certain amount of
arbitrariness is inevitable whenever a bright line must be drawn.
143. Id. at 320. Contra Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 433 A.2d 801
(1981), holding that a warranty implied by state law is a Magnuson-Moss warranty for pur-
poses of attorneys' fees.
144. Skelton, 660 F.2d at 320 (citing Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 500 F. Supp.
1181, 1190 (N.D. II. 1980)).
145. Skelton, 660 F.2d at 323.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1982).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (1982).
148. Skelton, 660 F.2d at 323 (Wood, Jr., J., dissenting).
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F. Unconscionability
The UCC gives courts discretion to declare unconscionable a
contract or part of a contract. 14 9 The provision purposely refrains
from defining unconscionable, leaving application to the court ana-
lyzing the circumstances of each case. Courts most often apply the
doctrine in cases where one party lacks bargaining power and the
other takes advantage of superior power to exact unfair terms.150
Inequality of bargaining power or unfair terms alone is insufficient
for a finding of unconscionability.
Application of the doctrine may be seen in Seekings v. Jimmy
GMC of Tucson, Inc. 15 The court held that although the seller of
a defective mobile home enjoyed superior bargaining power, the
terms it imposed on the purchaser were standard in the industry.
The contract was therefore not unconscionable. If the purchaser
could not get better terms elsewhere, then it appears that this
seller acted fairly. This reasoning is troubling. A seller who can
successfully defend itself by saying, "everybody does it" lacks in-
centive to offer more than minimal terms. Many courts resolve this
problem by looking beyond industry standards to determine
whether a term is fair. For example, in Evans v. Graham Ford,
Inc., ' 5  the dealer sold the purchaser a truck that had been modi-
fied. The warranty covered the truck as manufactured, but ex-
cluded the modifications. When problems developed with the mod-
ifications, the purchaser attempted to avoid the contract. The
court found the disclaimer unconscionable on grounds independent
of industry practice: (1) the dealer marketed the truck as a single
unit, (2) the dealer knew that the truck was unfit for the pur-
chaser's purposes, and (3) the dealer did not show any commercial
necessity for the disclaimer.5 s
Although the statute directs courts to determine whether the
149. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-302 (1985) provides:
UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT OR CLAUSE.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may re-
fuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract with-
out the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any uncon-
scionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportu-
nity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the
court in making the determination.
150. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
151. 131 Ariz. 1, 638 P.2d 223 (1981).
152. 2 Ohio App. 3d 435, 442 N.E.2d 777 (1981).
153. Id. at 438, 442 N.E.2d at 781.
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contract terms were unconscionable "at the time it was made,"
some courts have looked at events occurring thereafter. In La Vere
v. R.M. Burritt Motors, Inc.,'154 plaintiff purchased a used truck "as
is." The truck travelled only three blocks before breaking down.
The court noted that a contract, even if grossly unfair, cannot be
set aside on equitable grounds. Nevertheless, the court found the
disclaimer of warranties unconscionable, even though the circum-
stances that made it unconscionable-the breakdown-arose after
the sale. The court stated that circumstances existing at the time
of formation, including unequal knowledge, unequal bargaining
power, and a contract provided by the seller contributed to its
finding of unconscionability. 155
The court reached a proper result in La Vere. While it may
have reached an equitable result as a small claims court authorized
by statute to do substantial justice, it could have reached the same
result on established legal grounds. The court stated:
It certainly could not even be claimed by the plaintiff, that the
salesman Waterbury's claimed conversation or tactics were in any
way fraudulent, unconscionable or out of the ordinary for a used
car salesman, with the possible exception of the alleged remark
that if the plaintiff was not satisfied with the truck, he "could
give it back." Such a remark even if made, is excluded by the
Parole [sic] evidence rule. 160
The court could have regarded the salesman's remark as a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation that induced the sale. In this circumstance,
the parol evidence rule would not bar a tender of proof. Because
fraud falls within the formation exception to the parol evidence
rule, the court should have allowed the purchaser to use evidence
of fraud to avoid the contract. 56 On the other hand, the court sug-
gested that it is common knowledge that used car salespersons
often employ misleading comments and tactics. It thereby implied
that the purchaser should not have relied on the representations. 58
154. 112 Misc. 2d 225, 446 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Small Claims Ct. Oswego Co. 1982).
155. Id. at __, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 853-54.
156. Id. at __, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 28-36.
158. This rationale is reminiscent of the argument that an act is not unconscionable
because everybody does it. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53. On this basis, the
industry standards of behavior cannot be raised. Arguably, competition could change behav-
ior if the market rewarded those who raise the standards. Apparently, the opposite is the
case.
Moreover, if the test of reliance is whether a reasonable person would have relied, em-
pirical evidence shows that used car purchasers do rely on the representations of the sellers.
This may occur because the seller often misleads them as to the effect of the misrepresenta-
tion. For example, a purchaser may not believe that a car is in "A-I" condition. But if the
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In that event, the purchaser may have been unable to satisfy the
elements of fraud. '
The court also failed to consider a third alternative. The facts
of La Vere support the argument that the seller created an express
warranty when it sold "an automobile." The minimum level of per-
formance thereby warranted was breached when the vehicle broke
down after traversing three blocks.160
G. Revocation of Acceptance
Under the "perfect tender" rule of the UCC,'61 a purchaser
may reject goods which fail to conform to the contract specifica-
tions. The purchaser of a used car will rarely have the opportunity
to reject the car on these grounds, however, for on delivery the car
will generally appear to be as promised. Should the car later fail, it
may be too late to reject. 1 2  In Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Smith,16- however, the court held that a purchaser had not ac-
cepted when the car ceased operating 7/10 of a mile from the
dealer's place of business and the purchaser immediately stopped
payment and returned the car. 16
UCC section 2-608 may provide the purchaser a second oppor-
tunity to escape the deal by permitting revocation of acceptance. 1 5
seller also states that it "will stand behind the car 100%," the purchaser may think there is
little to lose. The purchaser may later discover that the disclaimer and merger clause have
nullified the promise. See FTC Statement supra note 4 and text accompanying notes 59-62,
108-22.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
161. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-601 (1985).
162. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-607(2) (1985).
163. 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
164. The court also found that the warranty limiting the purchaser's remedy to repair
was not effective under UCC 2-719(2), which provides that if a limited remedy fails of its
essential purpose, a court may award any remedy under the UCC. Id. at 447, 240 A.2d at
198. Furthermore, the warranty was not effective because it was not brought to his attention
or explained to him and because the disclaimer was not conspicuous. Id. at 447-48, 240 A.2d
at 198-99.
165. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-608 (1985) provides:
REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE IN WHOLE OR IN PART. (1) The buyer may revoke
his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially im-
pairs its value to him if he has accepted it:
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and
it has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was reasonably
induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's
assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the
buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any sub-
stantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects.
[Vol. 47
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In many cases, revocation of acceptance affords the purchaser a
more desirable remedy than breach of warranty. Generally, the
remedy for breach of warranty is the difference between the value
of the goods as promised and as delivered, often the cost of re-
pair. 1 6 Revocation of acceptance, on the other hand, permits the
purchaser to rescind the contract. 167 Purchasers who do not want
the goods repaired but want to get rid of them will prefer
revocation.' 68
Consumer purchasers rarely utilize this section, however, for it
presents considerable obstacles.""' The section permits revocation
only if the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of the
goods.17 0 Furthermore, the purchaser must have accepted the
goods either (1) on the assumption that the defect would be cured
and it was not cured, or (2) without discovery of the non-conform-
ity at the time of purchase. If the purchaser did not discover the
non-conformity at the time of purchase, the non-discovery must
have been due to either the difficulty of discovery or the seller's
assurances of quality. The purchaser must revoke within a reason-
able time after discovery and before any substantial change in the
condition of the goods occurs. Most importantly, a court may deny
the remedy to a purchaser who takes any steps inconsistent with
revocation, such as continuing to drive the car.17 '
In Bicknell v. B & S Enterprises,7 2 the purchaser attempted
to revoke acceptance on the grounds that the contract described
It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the
goods involved as if he had rejected them.
166. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-714 (1985).
167. A purchaser who obtains revocation may also obtain damages under MONT. CODE
ANN. § 30-2-711 (1985).
168. This rationale brought about the enactment of "Lemon Laws." Lemon Laws,
however, are generally inapplicable to used cars. See infra text accompanying notes 297-300.
169. For an excellent application of the elements of this statute to the sale of a new
car, see Druker, New Cars and UCC Section 2-608: Your Client Isn't Stuck With a Lemon, 4
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 177 (1970). See also Highsmith and Havens, Revocation of Acceptance
and the Defective Automobile: The Uniform Commercial Code to the Rescue, 18 AM. Bus. L.
J. 303 (1980).
170. Because UCC § 2-608 focuses on whether the non-conformity substantially im-
pairs the value of the goods to the buyer, some courts have applied a subjective test rather
than an objective test of substantial impairment. See, e.g., Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-
Pontiac, 117 N.H. 85, 370 A.2d 270 (1977).
171. See, e.g., Charney v. Ocean Pontiac, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 982
(Mass. Dist. Ct. 1975) (revocation denied after use); Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J.
Super. 373, 382 A.2d 954 (1978) (revocation granted despite use); Orange Motors of Coral
Gables, Inc. v. Dade Co. Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319 (Fla. App. 1972) (revocation granted
with offset for purchaser's use).
172. 160 Ga. App. 307, 287 S.E.2d 310 (1981).
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the car as equipped with a radio and air conditioner; in fact, the
radio and air conditioner did not function. The court held that she
did not have a right to reject under UCC section 2-601, for the
seller had not prevented her from inspecting the car. Nor did she
have a right to revoke under UCC section 2-608, for neither the
difficulty of discovery nor the dealer's assurances induced her ac-
ceptance. Although she did not allege breach of warranty, the court
noted that since she purchased the vehicle "as is," the fact that the
radio and air conditioner failed to function did not constitute a
breach of warranty. 173
Revocation was effective in Overland Bond and Investment
Corp. v. Howard. 74 After finding ineffective the seller's exclusion
of warranties, the court found that a used car was sold with im-
plied warranties. The warranty was breached when the transmis-
sion fell out of the car the day after purchase and the brakes failed
a week later. The purchaser gave notice of the defects by bringing
the car to the seller for repair. The purchaser satisfied the other
elements of revocation by showing that the defects were substan-
tial, that the purchaser could not have initially discovered them,
and that the seller assured the purchaser they would be cured.' 75
H. Conclusion
Although the UCC is not a consumer statute, courts must ap-
ply it to consumer purchases of automobiles. In applying the UCC,
courts are using law that is appropriate for merchants of equal bar-
gaining power and equal knowledge in an inappropriate setting.
Running through the case law, therefore, is an unexpressed tension
between the seller's right to withhold information and the pur-
chaser's need to know. Courts often resolve this tension by paying
lip service to the statutory rules on parol evidence and disclaimer
of warranties, while discarding these provisions when a consumer
purchaser has been harmed by the seller's failure to disclose.1
7 1
173. See supra text accompanying notes 108-22.
174. 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972). See also Stream v. Sportscar Salon,
Ltd., 91 Misc. 2d 99, 397 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1977); Williams v. College Dodge,
Inc., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 958 (Mich. Dist. Ct. 1972).
175. Overland, 9 Ill. App. 3d at 360, 292 N.E.2d at 177.
176. See, e.g., Tigar Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 204 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969) (dis-
claimer delivered after transaction completed); Orange Motors of Coral Gables, Inc., 258 So.
2d 319 (disclaimer not conspicuous); Williams, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 958 (dis-
claimer on back, not called to purchaser's attention); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99
N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968) (disclaimer on back of contract); Stream, 91 Misc. 2d
99, 397 N.Y.S.2d 677 (language ineffective); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc. 16
Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976) (disclaimer not negotiated).
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Assume, however, that a seller effectively disclaimed all war-
ranties. Would it be possible for a court to grant relief to the pur-
chaser of a defective used car? Under UCC section 2-608, a court
may grant revocation for a "non-conformity." Goods are non-con-
forming when they are not in accordance with the contractual obli-
gations.17 ' Does a seller have no obligations when marketing a car
"as is?' 17
In the classic case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,' 79
the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated disclaimers of warranty
in the sale of a new car on public policy grounds. Perhaps the time
has come to recognize that similar policy considerations apply to
the sale of used cars as well.
If courts recognized an express warranty in the sale of a used
car equivalent to the warranty of merchantability, they would af-
ford purchasers a minimum level of performance. The better. solu-
tion would be even more straightforward. Requiring the seller to
repair or disclose defects would provide both parties with the
knowledge necessary for market efficiency and equity.'80 In
Kopischke v. First Continental Corp.,'' the court used tort princi-
ples to supplant the implied warranty of merchantability. When a
defect in a used car might cause personal injury, the court placed
the obligation to inspect and repair on the seller.
Unlike warranty liability, tort liability may not reach all de-
fects, but only those that have the capacity to cause personal in-
jury or property damage.1 82 In Kopischke, for example, the court
stopped short of requiring repair of those defects that caused only
economic loss. That gap should be bridged.' 83 The purchaser of a
used car does not have the knowledge to determine the condition
of most components that affect safety. Yet the defects may cause
personal injury or economic loss. Where the defect may cause per-
sonal injury, the law requires repair. Where the defect may cause
only economic loss, the law should require disclosure.184 The mar-
177. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-106(2) (1985).
178. In Tricco v. Hynes, 2 Nfld. & P.E.I. 53 (Nfld. 1971), purchaser bought a used car
"as is." A month later, the Highway Department condemned the car as unroadworthy. Be-
cause the seller had failed to fulfill the fundamental obligations of the contract, the pur-
chaser was permitted to revoke even though the car had been sold "as is."
179. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
180. This hypothesis was subjected to empirical study in McNeil, Nevin, Trubek, and
Miller, Market Discrimination Against the Poor and the Impact of Consumer Disclosure
Laws: The Used Car Industry, 13 L. & Soc'v. REv. 695 (1979).
181. 187 Mont. 471, 610 P.2d 668 (1980).
182. See infra Part VII.B.
183. Examples of corrective legislation are found supra Part VIII.
184. A seller may not know in advance which type of injury a defect might cause.
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ket price of the car would then reflect its condition.
IV. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
A. The Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) adopted a Used Motor
Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule in 1985.186 While the FTC has ac-
tively issued rules or guidelines for numerous industries, rulemak-
ing concerning used cars had a long and tortuous history. In 1975,
Congress directed the FTC to issue rules dealing with "warranties
and warranty practices in connection with the sale of used motor
vehicles."18 The FTC staff proposed a rule, circulated for com-
ment in May, 1978, which mandated that dealers inspect used cars,
disclose defects regarding mechanical and safety components, and
disclose warranty coverage, repair cost estimates, and other infor-
mation. In August, 1981, the FTC issued its final rule; the rule re-
quired that dealers disclose only warranty information and certain
major defects known to the seller.
In May, 1982, pursuant to the authority of the FTC Improve-
ments Act of 1980,187 Congress vetoed the rule. In July, 1983, the
Supreme Court held the legislative veto provision unconstitu-
tional. 88 Nevertheless, the FTC decided to reconsider the rule. Af-
ter additional study, it adopted the present rule, which eliminates
the requirement that dealers disclose known defects.' The rule
became effective May 9, 1985.
The rule has two parts. The first part, section 455.1,1 defines
Whether the seller chooses to repair or disclose, the effect on the market price will be simi-
lar. Because Kopischke places squarely on the seller the risk of choosing not to repair, the
prudent seller may elect to repair.
185. 16 C.F.R. § 455 (1986).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 2309(b) (1982).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 57a-1 (1982).
188. U.S. Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); U.S. House of Representatives v. FTC,
463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
189. See 49 Fed. Reg. 45692-95 (1984). Judicial review of the original rule continues in
Miller Motor Car Corp. v. FTC, No. 81-4144 (2d Cir. filed ).
190. 16 C.F.R. (1986) § 455.1 provides:
GENERAL DUTIES OF A USED VEHICLE DEALER; DEFINITIONS.
(a) It is a deceptive act or practice for any used vehicle dealer, when that
dealer sells or offers for sale a used vehicle in or affecting commerce as 'commerce'
is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act:
(1) To misrepresent the mechanical condition of a used vehicle;
(2) To misrepresent the terms of any warranty offered in connection
with the sale of a used vehicle; and
(3) To represent that a used vehicle is sold with a warranty when
the vehicle is sold without any warranty.
(b) It is an unfair act or practice for any used vehicle dealer, when
[Vol. 47
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the general duties of a used vehicle dealer by prohibiting certain
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The rule provides that it is a
deceptive act or practice for a dealer to misrepresent the mechani-
cal condition of a car or to misrepresent the terms of a warranty. 191
These prohibitions derive from the FTC's study of abusive prac-
tices in the industry.192 The study showed that dealers often re-
present that a vehicle is in perfect condition, that the dealer will
repair the vehicle, or that "as is" means something other than an
exclusion of warranties. The FTC rule is therefore significant for
purchasers. As previously discussed, when a purchaser alleges
fraud or breach of warranty, sellers often defend on grounds that
the representations are inadmissible under the parol evidence rule,
that they are not affirmations of fact, or that the purchaser should
not have relied on them.19 3 These defenses are not available under
the rule.
The second part of the rule, sections 455.2 through 455.5,194
that dealer sells or offers for sale a used vehicle in or affecting commerce
as 'commerce' is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act:
(1) To fail to disclose, prior to sale, that a used vehicle is sold with-
out any warranty; and
(2) To fail to make available, prior to sale, the terms of any written
warranty offered in connection with the sale of a used vehicle.
(c) The Commission has adopted this Rule in order to prevent the
unfair and deceptive acts or practices defined in paragraphs (a) and (b).
It is a violation of this Rule for any used vehicle dealer to fail to comply
with the requirements set forth in Secs. 455.2 through 455.5 of this part.
If a used vehicle dealer complies with the requirements of Secs. 455.2
through 455.5 of this part, the dealer does not violate this Rule.
191. 16 C.F.R. § 455.1(a)(1)-(2) (1986). The phrase "unfair or deceptive act or prac-
tice" is a term of art, reflecting the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
192. FTC Statement, supra note 4.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19, 37-43.
194. 16 C.F.R. §§ 455.2 to 455.4 (1986) provide:
455.2. CONSUMER SALES-WINDOW FORM.
(a) General duty. Before you offer a used vehicle for sale to a consumer, you
must prepare, fill in as applicable and display on that vehicle a "Buyers Guide" as
required by this Rule.
(1) Use a side window to display the form so both sides of the form
can be read, with the title "Buyers Guide" facing to the outside. You
may remove a form temporarily from the window during any test drive,
but you must return it as soon as the test drive is over.
(2) The capitalization, punctuation and wording of all items, head-
ings, and text on the form must be exactly as required by this Rule. The
entire form must be printed in 100% black ink on a white stock no
smaller than 11 inches high by 7 1A inches wide in the type styles, sizes
and format indicated.
When filling out the form, follow the directions in (b) through (e) of this
section and § 455.4 of this part.
(b) Warranties-
(1) No Implied Warranty-"As Is"/No Warranty.
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requires the dealer to provide specific disclosures on a window
(i) If you offer the vehicle without any implied warranty, i.e.,
"as is", mark the box provided. If you offer the vehicle with im-
plied warranties only, substitute the disclosure specified below,
and mark the box provided. If you first offer the vehicle "as is" or
with implied warranties only but then sell it with a warranty,
cross out the "As Is-No Warranty" or "Implied Warranties
Only" disclosure, and fill in the warranty terms in accordance
with paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
(ii) If your state law limits or prohibits "as is" sales of vehi-
cles, that state law overrides this part and this rule does not give
you the right to sell "as is." In such states, the heading "As
Is-No Warranty" and the paragraph immediately accompanying
that phrase must be deleted from the form, and the following
heading and paragraph must be substituted. If you sell vehicles in
states that permit "as is" sales, but you choose to offer implied
warranties only, you must also use the following disclosure in-
stead of "As Is-No Warranty".
IMPLIED WARRANTIES ONLY
This means that the dealer does not make any specific
promises to fix things that need repair when you buy the vehicle
or after the time of sale. But, state law "implied warranties" may
give you some rights to have the dealer take care of serious
problems that were not apparent when you bought the vehicle.
(2) Full-Limited Warranty. If you offer the vehicle with a
warranty, briefly describe the warranty terms in the space pro-
vided. This description must include the following warranty
information:
(i) Whether the warranty offered is "Full" or "Limited."
Mark the box next to the appropriate designation.
(ii) Which of the specific systems are covered (for example,
"engine, transmission, differential"). You cannot use shorthand,
such as "drive train" or "power train" for covered systems.
(iii) The duration (for example, "30 days or 1,000 miles,
whichever occurs first").
(iv) The percentage of the repair cost paid by you (for exam-
ple, "The dealer will pay 100% of the labor and 100% of the
parts").
(v) If the vehicle is still under the manufacturer's original
warranty, you may add the following paragraph below the "Full/
Limited Warranty" disclosure: MANUFACTURER'S WAR-
RANTY STILL APPLIES. The manufacturer's original warranty
has not expired on the vehicle. Consult the manufacturer's war-
ranty booklet for details as to warranty coverage, service location,
etc.
If, following negotiations, you and the buyer agree to changes
in the warranty coverage, mark the changes on the form, as ap-
propriate. If you first offer the vehicle with a warranty, but then
sell it without one, cross out the offered warranty and mark either
the "As Is-No Warranty" box or the "Implied Warranties Only"
box, as appropriate.
(3) Service contracts. If you make a service contract (other
than a contract that is regulated in your state as the business of
insurance) available on the vehicle, you must add the following
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sticker. The primary disclosure informs the purchaser whether the
dealer is marketing the car without a warranty ["AS IS - NO
WARRANTY"] or with a warranty ["WARRANTY"]. To prevent
any misunderstanding in the sales contract, the rule incorporates
the window form into the contract as the terms of the warranty.
Additional language in the sticker advises the purchaser of some of
the pitfalls of used car sales. For example, the sticker warns that
"spoken promises are difficult to enforce" and suggests that the
purchaser ask to have the vehicle inspected by a mechanic. The
sticker also contains a list of "some major defects that may occur
heading and paragraph below the "Full/Limited Warranty" dis-
closure and mark the box provided.
SERVICE CONTRACT
A service contract is available at an extra charge on this vehi-
cle. If you buy a service contract within 90 days of the time of
sale, state law "implied warranties" may give you additional
rights.
(c) Name and Address. Put the name and address of your dealer-
ship in the space provided. If you do not have a dealership, use the
name and address of your place of business (for example, your service
station) or your own name and home address.
(d) Make, Model, Model Year, VIN. Put the vehicle's name (for
example, "Chevrolet"), model (for example, "Vega"), model year, and
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) in the spaces provided. You may
write the dealer stock number in the space provided or you may leave
this space blank.
(e) Complaints. In the space provided, put the name and telephone
number of the person who should be contacted if any complaints arise
after sale.
455.3. WINDOW FORM.
(a) Form given to buyer. Give the buyer of a used vehicle sold by
you the window form displayed under § 455.2 containing all of the dis-
closures required by the Rule and reflecting the warranty coverage
agreed upon. If you prefer, you may give the buyer a copy of the origi-
nal, so long as that copy accurately reflects all of the disclosures re-
quired by the Rule and the warranty coverage agreed upon.
(b) Incorporated into contract. The information on the final version
of the window form is incorporated into the contract of sale for each
used vehicle you sell to a consumer. Information on the window form
overrides any contrary provisions in the contract of sale. To inform the
consumer of these facts, include the following language conspicuously in
each consumer contract of sale:
The information you see on the window form for this vehicle is part
of this contract. Information on the window form overrides any contrary
provisions in the contract of sale.
455.4. CONTRARY STATEMENTS.
You may not make any statements, oral or written, or take other
actions which alter or contradict the disclosures required by §§ 455.2
and 455.3. You may negotiate over warranty coverage, as provided in §
455.2(b) of this part, as long as the final warranty terms are identified in
the contract of sale and summarized on the copy of the window form
you give to the buyer.
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in used motor vehicles." Unlike earlier drafts, the rule does not
require the dealer to disclose whether the particular vehicle suffers
from any of the defects. It simply puts the purchaser on notice of
things to look for.
B. Remedies
If a dealer violates the rule, a purchaser has only limited reme-
dies. Because the FTC Act contains no provision for private
claims, enforcement is the responsibility of the FTC.195 And since
its resources are limited, the FTC can undertake only prosecutions
that serve the public interest, not the interest of one injured pur-
chaser. 96 Furthermore, the burden of proving a violation of the
first part of the rule, which prohibits deceptive acts and practices,
differs from the burden of proving a violation of the second part of
the rule, requiring various disclosures. The explanation may be
clarified by discussion of the FTC's rule-making authority.
When the FTC prosecutes a violation of the FTC Act, it must
prove that the respondent committed an "unfair or deceptive act
or practice."197 Since 1962, the FTC has been issuing "trade regula-
tion rules" that delineate specific practices it considers unfair or
deceptive. If the respondent violates a rule, the FTC does not have
to prove that the prohibited practice is unfair or deceptive; viola-
tion of a rule is ipso facto a violation of the Act.198
This distinction appears in the Used Motor Vehicle Trade
Regulation Rule. The rule expressly provides that a violation of
sections 455.2 through 455.5, requiring disclosure, is a violation of
the rule. 199 Therefore, the burden on the FTC to prove that a
dealer failed to make a required disclosure is straightforward: vio-
lation of the rule is a violation of the FTC Act. By negative impli-
cation, violation of section 455.1, prohibiting unfair or deceptive
acts or practices, is not a violation of the rule. Violation of section
455.1 is, however, a violation of the FTC Act.200 For the FTC to
195. Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973).
196. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982).
197. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982). Similarly, if the violation were the basis of a private
action under the CPA, a consumer does not have to prove that conduct proscribed by a rule
is unfair or deceptive; in the absence of a rule, the consumer would have to do so.
198. The rulemaking power of the FTC was upheld in National Petroleum Refiners
Assn. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
199. 16 C.F.R. § 455.1(c) (1986).
200. The rule is not a model of clarity. Section 455.1(c) provides: "If a used vehicle
dealer complies with the requirements of §§ 455.2 through 455.5 of this part, the dealer does
not violate this Rule." This statement may lead the unwary to believe there is no remedy for
violation of § 455.1.
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prove that a dealer misrepresented the mechanical condition of a
car or the terms of a warranty, therefore, it would also have to
prove that the particular misrepresentation constituted an unfair
or deceptive act or practice. Proof that the misrepresentation oc-
curred would not in itself suffice.
C. Conclusion
The present rule is considerably weaker than earlier versions,
for it does not require the dealer to disclose known defects. In-
stead, it prohibits certain practices and requires the dealer to clar-
ify the contract terms, notably the meaning of sale "as is." Many
disputes between dealers and purchasers arise because of alleged
discrepancies between the bargain discussed orally and the written
agreement. Clarification will undoubtedly prove helpful to pur-
chasers, whether they have failed to understand or have been mis-
led by sellers. It should prove advantageous to dealers as well. If
they comply with the required disclosures, fewer misunderstand-
ings should arise. While FTC enforcement of the rule may be lim-
ited, the rule provides assistance to purchasers who bring private
actions under state law.20 1 The ability of a purchaser to bring a
private action is the subject of the next section.
V. MONTANA CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
The Montana Consumer Protection Act (CPA), 02 prohibits
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade
or commerce."20  Modeled after the FTC Act and known as a "Lit-
tle FTC Act," the CPA provides for actions to be brought by the
state, either by the Department of Commerce, the Attorney Gen-
eral or a County Attorney. 204 Most importantly, the CPA goes be-
yond the FTC Act by permitting a private right of actio. 2 05 While
201. See infra Part V.
202. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-101 to -142 (1985).
203. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103 (1985).
204. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-111 to -115, -121 (1985).
205. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133 (1985) provides in part:
DAMAGES-NOTICE TO PUBLIC AGENCIES-ATTORNEY FEES-PRIOR JUDGMENT AS
EVIDENCE. (1) Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss
of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by
another person of a method, act, or practice declared unlawful by 30-14-103 may
bring an individual but not a class action under the rules of civil procedure in the
district court of the county in which the seller or lessor resides or has his principal
place of business or is doing business to recover actual damages or $200, whichever
is greater. The court may, in its discretion, award up to three times the actual
damages sustained and may provide such equitable relief as it considers necessary
1986]
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the CPA may prove very useful to the purchaser of a used car, a
number of questions raised by the statute have not been
answered.206
The CPA provides a private right of action only to a person
who purchases for "personal, family, or household purposes. '20 7 A
person who purchases a car for business purposes, therefore, could
not bring an action under the statute. It is not clear, however,
whether the act applies to private sales, such as a sale through a
classified advertisement, as well as to purchases from dealers.
While the act broadly defines "trade" and "commerce, 208 the leg-
islature may have intended that it be applied only where the pub-
lic interest would be affected. The FTC Act, by comparison, ex-
pressly requires public interest in the proceeding as a prerequisite
for FTC action.209 Montana may have concurred with this view
when it adopted administrative rules that apply only to dealers.210
On the other hand, in Matthews v. Berryman,211 the defend
ant asked the court to apply the act to an attorney performing ser-
vices for an individual, an apparently private transaction. While
the court did not address the question of whether the act applied
to the transaction, it found that the acts complained of were not
unfair or deceptive. 12 Logically, this issue should not have been
reached unless the act applied. Perhaps the actions of an attorney
involve the public interest to a greater degree than an individual's
one-time sale of a car.13 It seems persuasive that public resources
or proper.
(3) In any action brought under this section, the court may award the prevail-
ing party reasonable attorney fees incurred in prosecuting or defending the action.
206. The CPA is patterned after the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law developed by the FTC in conjunction with the Committee on Suggested State Legisla-
tion of the Council of State Governments. The legislative history and the case law of other
states with similar legislation is a valuable source for interpretation. See NATIONAL CON-
SUMER LAW CENTER, UNFAIR AND DEcEPrIvE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 1.2 (1982).
207. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133 (1985).
208. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-102(6) (1985) provides:
"Trade" and "commerce" mean the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or dis-
tribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal,
or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value, wherever situate,
and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people
of this state.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982) provides for Commission action "if it shall appear to the
Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public.
210. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 8.78.201(4) (1981).
211. 196 Mont. 49, 637 P.2d 822 (1981).
212. Id. at 55, 637 P.2d at 826.
213. While a substantial number of used car sales are private, the number of com-
plaints against dealers is proportionately greater. See FTC Statement, supra note 4, at
[Vol. 47
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should not be expended in resolving disputes that do not involve
the public interest. Therefore, the purchaser of a used car from a
private seller should not be permitted to invoke the act absent a
demonstration that the sale affects the public.2 14
If the transaction is within the scope of the CPA, a purchaser
should find it easier to prove the claim than to prove a UCC or
common law claim. Under the CPA, a consumer must prove that
(1) the seller employed an unfair or deceptive act or practice which
(2) resulted in an ascertainable loss of money or property. '15 Be-
cause the issue under the CPA is whether the seller engaged in the
act or practice, and not whether the seller's representation was in-
corporated in the contract, the parol evidence rule would not bar
evidence of the seller's statement. Nor would the seller's "as is"
exclusion of warranties preclude an action. In T & W Chevrolet v.
Darvial,216 the court found that the seller committed an unfair or
deceptive act or practice, even though the car was sold "as is."
A claim under the CPA, unlike a claim in fraud, need not al-
lege that the seller knew the representation was false,'1 7 nor that
the purchaser actually relied on it. 21 8 In Testo v. Russ Dunmire
Oldsmobile, Inc.,1 9 the Washington Court of Appeals held that a
seller violated the Washington CPA when it sold a car that had
been modified and used for racing without disclosing those facts to
the purchaser. The court rejected the seller's argument that the act
required an allegation of misrepresentation, holding that the
seller's good faith and the purchaser's actual deception were
irrelevant. 220
In a case arising under the act, one of the most difficult issues
is to determine whether the act or practice complained of is unfair
or deceptive. To construe the "unfair or deceptive" standard, the
statute expressly refers to the FTC Act and to rules promulgated
by the Montana Department of Commerce.221 The only FTC rule
45,702.
214. See, e.g., Allen v. Anderson, 15 Wash. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24 (1976); but see Peo-
ple ex rel. Scott v. Lavance, 105 Ill. App. 3d 171, 434 N.E.2d 5 (1982).
215. Scott v. Western Int'l Surplus Sales, Inc., 267 Or. 512, 517 P.2d 661 (1973) (act
applied when article was not as promised even though equal in value).
216. 196 Mont. 287, 641 P.2d 1368 (1982). Parenthetically, Darvial was the plaintiff;
the parties' names were reversed when the case was reported.
217. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967).
218. United States Retail Credit Assn. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 1962).
219. 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976).
220. Id. at 50-51, 554 P.2d at 357-58.
221. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-104 (1985). The Montana Supreme Court has upheld
this statutory scheme of delegation of authority. Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 187
Mont. 471, 610 P.2d 668 (1980); T & W Chevrolet v. Darvial, 196 Mont. 287, 641 P.2d 1368
19861
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directly applicable to the used car industry is the FTC Trade Reg-
ulation Rule on Sale of Used Motor Vehicles.2  To satisfy the ele-
ment of the CPA that the seller committed an unfair or deceptive
act or practice, the purchaser could show that the seller violated
the second part of the rule.2 23 To show that the seller violated the
first part of the rule, 2 4 the purchaser would also have to prove that
the act or practice was deceptive. 22 5 To prove that an act or prac-
tice is unfair or deceptive, the purchaser can look beyond the Rule
on Sale of Used Motor Vehicles. Acts or practices prohibited in
other industries and case law may be used by analogy.22 6
The Department of Commerce has issued extremely detailed
administrative rules concerning motor car sales.2 27 In T &
(1982).
222. 16 C.F.R. § 455 (1986).
223. 16 C.F.R. §§ 455.2-.5 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 194-200.
224. 16 C.F.R. § 455.1 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 185-96.
225. See supra Part IV.
226. FTC Guides and Trade Practice Rules for various industries are found in 16
C.F.R. ch. 1 (1986).
227. MoNT. ADMIN. R. § 8.78.204 (1981) provides:
MOTOR VEHICLE SALES. It shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a
motor vehicle dealer to:
(1) represent, either directly or indirectly, that any motor vehicle
advertised or sold is an "executive vehicle" unless the vehicle has been
used exclusively by its manufacturer, its distributor or a dealer for the
commercial or personal use of the manufacturer's, subsidiary's or
dealer's employees;
(2) represent either directly or indirectly that certain motor vehicles
advertised or sold by the dealer are "demonstrators" or "demos" unless
such vehicles have been driven by prospective customers of that or an-
other dealership selling the vehicles;
(3) represent the previous usage or status of a motor vehicle to be
something that, in fact, it was not; or make such representations unless
the dealer has sufficient information to support the representation;
(4) represent the quality of care, regularity of servicing or general
condition of any motor vehicle unless supportable by material fact;
(5) represent that a motor vehicle has not sustained substantial
structural or skin damage unless such statement is made in good faith
and unless such vehicle has been inspected by the dealer, his agent or
representative to determine whether or not such vehicle has incurred
such damage in the past;
(6) fail to fully and conspicuously disclose in writing at or before the
consummation of sale any warranty or guarantee terms, obligations and
conditions that the dealer or manufacturer has given to the buyer of the
motor vehicle. If the warranty obligations are to be shared by both the
dealer and the buyer then the methods of determining the percentage of
monetary repair costs to be assumed by both parties shall also be dis-
closed. If the dealer intends to disclaim any expressed or implied war-
ranties then he shall make such disclaimer in writing in a conspicuous
manner;
(7) fail to honor his expressed warranty agreement or any warran-
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W Chevrolet, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's finding that a seller who represented a car with a cracked
frame as "in perfect condition" and "completely gone over" vio-
lated the CPA.2 1' The court did not cite or discuss the specific
FTC decisions or administrative rules the seller violated, but noted
that the seller's description of the condition of the car constituted
a misrepresentation.229
No case in Montana has construed the statutory requirement
of an "ascertainable loss. ''23 A purchaser's out-of-pocket repair
costs would clearly qualify, as would the purchaser's loss of the
bargain when the goods as delivered were less valuable than the
goods as promised. A purchaser is on shakier ground when claim-
ing that the goods as delivered differ in description from the goods
as promised but are not less valuable. In Hinchliffe v. American
Motors Corp.,231 the purchaser alleged that a car sold with four-
wheel drive did not actually offer full-time four-wheel drive. Be-
cause it was a standard feature on the car, he had not paid more
ties implied by law;
(8) misrepresent warranty coverage, application period, any war-
ranty transfer costs to the customer or conditions which are given by the
dealer, factory or other party;
(9) obtain signatures from customers on contracts which are not
fully completed at the time signed or which do not reflect accurately the
negotiations and agreement between the customer and the dealer;
(10) require or accept a deposit from a prospective customer prior
to entering into a mutually binding valid contract for the purchase and
sale of a motor vehicle unless the customer is given a written receipt
which states how long the dealer will hold the motor vehicle from other
sale, the amount of the deposit, and clearly and conspicuously states
whether the deposit is refundable or nonrefundable and upon what
conditions;
(11) add to the cash price of the motor vehicle a fee for routine
handling of documents and forms essential to the transfer of ownership
to customers, or a fee for any other ordinary and customary business
overhead expense (otherwise known as a "documentary fee") unless the
fee is fully disclosed to customers in all mutually binding valid contracts
concerning the motor vehicle's selling price;
(12) alter or change the odometer mileage of the motor vehicle;
(13) fail to disclose to any customers the actual year model of the
motor vehicle;
(14) fail to transfer title to a vehicle as soon as is reasonably possi-
ble after sale of the vehicle to a customer;
(15) fail to disclose to a customer, in writing, at or prior to the time
of sale, that taxes, if any, are due and owing on the vehicle to be sold;
(16) engage in any unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
228. T & W Chevrolet v. Darvial, 196 Mont. 287, 641 P.2d 1368.
229. Id. at 289, 641 P.2d at 1369.
230. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133 (1985).
231. 184 Conn. 607, 440 A.2d 810 (1981). The customer later lost on the merits. 192
Conn. 252, 470 A.2d 1216 (1984).
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for it. On defendant's motion to dismiss, the court held that the
statute required a showing of a loss. Although the consumer had
not suffered damages, he had alleged a loss."2
A successful claimant under the CPA can recover the greater
of actual damages or $200. For example, if the actual damages are
$10, the court may award $200. The court may also award exem-
plary damages of up to three times the actual damages, and may
provide equitable relief. In T & W Chevrolet, the court upheld an
award of exemplary damages of $750 and rescission of the transac-
tion.2 s The court cited neither legal authority for the award of re-
scission nor the factual basis for the exemplary damages. Presuma-
bly the statute permits rescission since it allows the court to
provide "such equitable relief as it considers necessary or
proper."2 4 Apparently the trial court found actual damage in the
amount of the purchase price. The Montana Supreme Court, how-
ever, found that there was no award of actual damages.235 Since
the statute allows exemplary damages based on actual damages,
the decision indicates that the court will liberally construe and ap-
ply the CPA remedies.
Unlike a claimant under the common law or the UCC, a claim-
ant under the CPA has an expectation of coming out ahead, partic-
ularly if the claim is small.23 6 In addition to the other remedies, the
CPA authorizes the court to award reasonable attorneys' fees to
the prevailing party. 37 The provision may also enable the con-
sumer to find an attorney willing to pursue the claim at no out-of-
pocket cost. While a court may in theory require a losing consumer
to pay the seller's attorneys' fees, it is unlikely to do so if the con-
sumer brings the claim in good faith.23 8 Courts vary widely in com-
puting the amount of the fee award in consumer cases. Some
courts demonstrate unwillingness to award an amount in excess of
the actual recovery; most award on the basis of time expended
232. Hinchlifle, 184 Conn. at 613-20, 440 A.2d at 814-17. See also Scott, 267 Or. 512,
517 P.2d 661.
233. 196 Mont. at 293-95, 641 P.2d at 1371-72.
234. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133 (1985).
235. 196 Mont. at 293, 641 P.2d at 1371.
236. Voltaire is said to have remarked, "I have come close to ruin twice in my life:
once when I lost a lawsuit and once when I won one."
237. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133 (1985).
238. In denying fees in LaChance v. McKown, 649 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983),
the court articulated this standard: "For attorney's fees to be awarded to the defendants
under [the CPA], the jury must find that the suit was brought in bad faith, or for the
purpose of harassment, and the court must then conclude upon such findings that the suit
was groundless." See also Johnny Crews Ford, Inc. v. Llewellyn, 353 So. 2d 607 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (fees awarded to merchant; standard not articulated).
[Vol. 47
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even if the actual recovery is small.2 3 9
VI. THE FEDERAL ODOMETER ACT
Tampering with odometers is a widespread problem of partic-
ular significance to consumers. 40 The consumer purchaser cannot
detect the tampering, even with a thorough inspection. Because
mileage is a significant factor in determining the condition and
value of a used car, the tampering seriously skews the market.2 41
The purchaser of a tampered car not only pays too much, but as-
sumes the risk of mechanical failure that was not reasonably
foreseeable.
The Federal Odometer Act2 42 prohibits tampering with odom-
eters on motor vehicles and imposes disclosure on sellers. The act
makes it unlawful for any person to disconnect, reset, or alter the
odometer of any vehicle. A transferor, whether dealer or private
seller,24 s must provide a written, signed disclosure statement before
the transfer is complete. The statement must certify that the
odometer reading is either (1) correct, (2) correct in excess of
99,999 miles, or (3) incorrect.2 44 A transferor who provides a false
statement violates the act. The act provides for a private civil ac-
tion in which the purchaser can recover the greater of three times
the actual damages or $1500,245 plus costs and reasonable attor-
neys' fees. 46
The weakness of the act is the difficulty of proof: it requires
proof of the defendant's intent to defraud.2 47 Courts are divided as
to whether plaintiff must show actual knowledge or whether con-
structive knowledge is sufficient. That is, if a seller does not actu-
ally tamper with the odometer but should reasonably know from
239. See, e.g., Earl v. Beaulieu, 620 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1980) (Truth-in-Lending claim;
judgment for $220, attorneys' fees of $220); Watkins v. Roach Cadillac, Inc., 7 Kan. App. 8,
637 P.2d 458 (1981) (CPA claim; judgment for $2000, attorneys' fees of $3000); Duncan v.
Luke Johnson Ford, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1980) (CPA claim; judgment for $150, attor-
neys' fees of $3500).
240. 15 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
241. Id.
242. The Federal Odometer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1981-91 (1982), is part of the Motor
Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act.
243. 49 C.F.R. § 580.3 (1986).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 1984 (1982).
245. In Delay v. Hearn Ford, 373 F. Supp. 791 (D. S.C. 1974), a purchaser traded in
his car, then repurchased it a few weeks later. He discovered that the car he traded in with
70,000 miles on it now had 49,000. In denying seller's motion for summary judgment, the
court stated that this was an appropriate case for recovery of the minimum damages of
$1500, for there were no actual damages. Id. at 795-96.
246. 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (1982).
247. 15 U.S.C. § 1989(a) (1982) requires "intent to defraud."
1986]
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the circumstances that tampering occurred, does that seller intend
to deceive the purchaser when it certifies that the odometer is cor-
rect? In Jones v. Fenton Ford, Inc.,2" the previous owner had in-
formed the seller that the odometer was inaccurate. The seller mis-
informed the purchaser due to an alleged "clerical error." The
court held that the act applies to sellers who recklessly disregard
the truth as well as to sellers who intentionally deceive. In con-
trast, Mataya v. Behm Motors, Inc.,249 held that the statute re-
quires actual knowledge and not constructive knowledge.
The reasoning in Jones seems more consistent with the legisla-
tive intent expressed in the statute, which emphasizes purchasers'
reliance on the information.25 0 The Senate Report stated:
the test of "knowingly" was incorporated so that the auto dealer
with expertise now would have an affirmative duty to mark 'true
mileage unknown' if, in the exercise of reasonable care, he would
have reason to know that the mileage was more than that which
the odometer had recorded or which the previous owner had
certified.2 5
1
In Nieto v. Pence,22 the court adopted a standard more like that
of the Senate Report, holding that intent may be inferred if the
seller "reasonably should have known that a vehicle's odometer
reading was incorrect." The considerable reliance by the purchaser
coupled with the superior knowledge of the seller support shifting
this risk to the seller.2 53 A seller who has any doubt could escape
liability under the act by refraining from certifying the reading as
correct.
A purchaser might be able to circumvent the problems of
248. 427 F. Supp. 1328 (D. Conn. 1977).
249. 409 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
250. 15 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) provides:
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE. The Congress hereby finds that purchasers, when buying
motor vehicles, rely heavily on the odometer reading as an index of the condition
and value of such vehicle; that purchasers are entitled to rely on the odometer
reading as an accurate reflection of the mileage actually traveled by the vehicle;
that an accurate indication of the mileage traveled by a motor vehicle assists the
purchaser in determining its safety and reliability; and that motor vehicles move
in the current of interstate and foreign commerce or affect such commerce. It is
therefore the purpose of this title to prohibit tampering with odometers on motor
vehicles and to establish certain safeguards for the protection of purchasers with
respect to the sale of motor vehicles having altered or reset odometers.
251. Senate Report No. 92-413, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (1972), 3971-72 (empha-
sis added).
252. 578 F.2d 640, 642 (5th Cir. 1978).
253. A broad reading of the statute is supported by Stier v. Park Pontiac, Inc., 391 F.
Supp. 397 (S.D. W. Va. 1975), in which the court stated that the purpose of the act is to
reward purchasers who discover tampering and bring it to the attention of the courts.
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proof posed by the act by stating an additional claim for relief for
odometer tampering under the state Consumer Protection Act.
Under the CPA, a consumer need not prove intent. The adminis-
trative rules state that it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice
for a motor vehicle dealer to "alter or change the odometer mileage
of the motor vehicle. '254 Under this rule, the change itself, irre-
spective of intent, constitutes a violation. The dealer might defend
on grounds that even if it sold a tampered vehicle, it did not do the
tampering. This defense would run afoul of the administrative rule
that makes it an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a dealer to
"represent the previous usage or status of a motor vehicle to be
something that, in fact, it was not. '255 Even if the dealer made no
affirmative statement about mileage, the odometer reading is itself
a representation. As between an innocent dealer and an innocent
purchaser, the risk of loss should be placed on the dealer, who is in
a better position to inspect or otherwise obtain information about
the vehicle.
VII. CLAIMS AGAINST THE MANUFACTURER
A. Introduction
By definition, a used car has been sold at least once prior to
the present purchase. At a minimum, the car has gone through this
chain of sales: manufacturer-original dealer-original pur-
chaser-present dealer-present purchaser. When defects arise,
the present purchaser usually presses a claim against the present
dealer. A claim against the dealer in warranty may fail because of
disclaimers; a claim in tort may be difficult to prove.2 5 1
If the court bars a claim against the dealer, or if the dealer is
not available as a defendant, the purchaser may wish to look to
other parties in the chain of sales. In contract theory, the pur-
chaser is in "privity" with only the present dealer. When suing in
contract for breach of warranty, the doctrine of privity may bar
the present purchaser from reaching back to others in the chain.2 57
A purchaser may reach those parties if (1) the court recognizes a
theory that dispenses with privity, or (2) they voluntarily submit
to adjudication of their liability, or (3) they are compelled to adju-
dicate it.
254. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 8.78.204(12) (1981).
255. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 8.78.204(3) (1981).
256. See supra Parts II.C. and III.
257. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 97-98 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
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B. Products Liability
Purchasers may have difficulty asserting claims against previ-
ous individual owners, for implied warranties are given only by
merchants and strict liability in tort is premised on enterprise lia-
bility.25 Purchasers will therefore look to the manufacturer and to
dealers in the sales chain as potential defendants. If the law im-
posed liability on a manufacturer or dealer, the absence of privity
and warranty would not bar the present purchaser's claim. Pur-
chasers have attempted to impose such liability on manufacturers
and dealers in negligence, in warranty, and in strict tort liability.
259
1. Negligence
Because a negligence claim dispenses with the privity require-
ment, present purchasers may bring the claim against a remote
manufacturer. While a negligence claim is usually brought for per-
sonal injury, the manufacturer's negligence may expose it to liabil-
ity for harm to the car itself. 260 In general, courts deny recovery in
negligence for loss of the bargain. In Seely v. White Motor Co.,2 61
Justice Traynor reasoned:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery
for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is
not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in
having an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests,
rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a
manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He
can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by
defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety de-
fined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of
harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of his prod-
ucts in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the product
was designed to meet the consumer's demands2 2
In Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Division,63 the court held that the
manufacturer's duty was limited to seeing that the goods were free
258. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-314 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
comment f (1965).
259. See Streich v. Hilton-Davis, A Division of Sterling Drug, Inc., __ Mont.
692 P.2d 440 (1984), finding theories of warranty, negligence, and strict liability applicable
to a claim against a manufacturer for damage caused by defective goods. The practical at-
torney will note that even if a court can be persuaded to apply these doctrines, it may not
award attorneys' fees in claims based on them.
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 comment c (1965).
261. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
262. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
263. 145 Cal. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665 (1956).
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from defects that might produce bodily injury or damage to other
property. On the other hand, in State ex rel. Western Seed Pro-
duction Corp. v. Campbell,264 the Supreme Court of Oregon found
a manufacturer liable for foreseeable economic loss. The difficulty
a purchaser may have proving negligence combined with the diffi-
culty of securing an award for economic loss makes negligence
problematic for the purchaser of a used car.265
2. Warranty
Strict liability in warranty is a troubling concept, for warranty par-
takes of both contract and tort.166 To impose on manufacturers
warranty liability to remote purchasers, courts would have to dis-
pense with the contract concepts of privity, notice, and disclaim-
ers. 2 67 In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,2 68 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey found a manufacturer and dealer liable to the
purchaser on a theory of implied warranty of safety, without priv-
ity and without negligence. The court declared the warranty dis-
claimers contrary to public policy. The law might have continued
to develop in the direction of strict liability in warranty, were it
not for the explosion of the doctrine of strict tort liability.269 If
contract barriers such as disclaimers block recovery, a court could
eliminate these barriers rather than apply a tort theory.
3. Strict Tort Liability
A claim of strict liability in tort gives purchasers the best of
both worlds, for the claim does not require proof of either privity
264. 250 Or. 262, 269-70, 442 P.2d 215, 218 (1968) (citing Franklin, When Worlds Col-
lide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. Rav. 974,
989 (1966)).
265. Negligence claims against a dealer are discussed supra Part II.B. See the discus-
sion of the negligence claim in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960) in PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 257, § 99.
266. Warranty is "a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract."
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
267. Under the UCC, a purchaser may not recover on a warranty without giving notice
to the seller within a reasonable time after the breach. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-607(3)
(1985). See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963).
268. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
269. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 257, § 98. See also Prosser, The Fall of the Cita-
del, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
270. On the use of the doctrine of unconscionability to eliminate the barriers, see
supra Part III.F. In Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965), the
court stated that strict liability in tort is "hardly more than what exists under implied war-
ranty when stripped of the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer, requirements of notice
of defect, and limitation through inconsistencies with express warranties."
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or negligence.Y Strict liability, however, arises only "where the
product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition
not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unrea-
sonably dangerous to him. 2 72 Applying the doctrine to the sale of
used cars raises a number of thorny questions. Should it apply to
the sale of used goods, when the product may not be defective, but
merely worn out? Should it apply when the defect, even if danger-
ous, causes only economic loss? For example, a dealer sells a used
car with 50,000 miles on it. Because of normal wear, the brakes
fail. The purchaser's only loss is the cost of replacing the brakes.
Should strict liability apply?
Some authorities believe that liability for mere economic loss,
where the defects do not cause danger to persons, remains a proper
area for contract rather than tort doctrine.27 3 In Russell v. Ford
Motor Co.,2 74 the Supreme Court of Oregon allowed a purchaser to
recover for economic loss where the defect did not cause personal
injury but was "man endangering." The case suggests that a disap-
pointed purchaser can not recover in strict liability but an endan-
gered one can. Other jurisdictions, including Colorado and Mon-
tana, have applied strict liability to economic loss. 2 75 In Hiigel v.
General Motors Corp.,278 purchaser's mobile home chassis suffered
damage because of improper torquing. The Colorado Supreme
Court expressly adopted the doctrine of strict liability set forth in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 402A, applying it to dam-
age to the vehicle, but refusing to extend the theory to liability for
commercial or business loss.
271. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) (1965) states:
The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965).
273. "The Uniform Commercial Code is generally regarded as the exclusive source for
ascertaining when a seller is subject to liability for damages if the claim is based on intangi-
ble economic loss not attributable to physical injury to person or harm to a tangible thing
other than the defective product itself." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 257, § 95A at 680.
See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTs § 101 (1965); Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Mary-
land, Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980).
274. 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383 (1978).
275. See also Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Maure v.
Fordham Motor Sales, Inc., 98 Misc. 2d 979, 414 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1979). In
Maure, the court held that the purchaser of a used car may recover against the manufac-
turer in strict liability for loss of the vehicle. The purchaser was unable to prove negligence,
but proved that the car was defective when it left the hands of the manufacturer.
276. 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975).
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In Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes Corp."7 the Mon-
tana Supreme Court held that a strict liability action may lie when
the only damage suffered is economic loss. The purchaser of a mo-
bile home sued the manufacturer and the dealer when the ceiling
sagged and the walls bowed. The trial court dismissed the claim in
strict liability; the jury found for the defendants on the negligence,
fraud, and breach of warranty claims. Noting that it had adopted
the doctrine of strict liability in tort,' 7 8 the supreme court stated,
"we extend the doctrine of strict liability in tort to include those
instances where the only injury suffered is to the defective product
itself."217
Thompson illustrates the kind of situation in which a used car
purchaser may have to rely on strict liability. The purchaser
bought the mobile home "as is" with a short-term express war-
ranty. The court instructed the jury that a warranty may be dis-
claimed, so the disclaimer may have had the effect of barring the
warranty claim.2 80 The purchaser was unable to overcome the con-
siderable burden of proving her claims of fraud and negligence.
The court explained the rationale of allowing a claim in strict lia-
bility in such circumstances:
The public remains in an unfair bargaining position as compared
to the manufacturer. In the case of damage arising only out of
loss of the product, this inequality in bargaining position becomes
more pronounced. Warranties are easily disclaimed. Negligence is
difficult, if not impossible, to prove. The consumer does not gen-
erally have large damages to attract the attention of lawyers who
must handle these cases on a contingent fee. We feel that the con-
sumer should be protected by affording a legal remedy which
causes the manufacturer to bear the cost of its own defective
products.281
While the court's analysis identified the responsibility of the man-
ufacturer, the court did not address whether the strict liability
claim would lie against the dealer.82 Substantial authority sup-
277. 198 Mont. 461, 647 P.2d 334 (1982).
278. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973).
279. Thompson, 198 Mont. at 466, 647 P.2d at 337.
280. Id. at 468, 647 Mont. at 338. Interestingly, in Hiigel, 190 Colo. at 65-66, 544 P.2d
at 989-90, the court avoided the disclaimer on grounds that it was not called to the buyer's
attention and independently agreed to by him.
281. Thompson, 198 Mont. at 466-67, 647 P.2d at 337.
282. Procedurally, the trial court had dismissed strict liability claims against the
dealer and the manufacturer. The court's decision remanding the case for trial would sub-
ject both parties to liability. Id. at 469, 647 P.2d at 338. Strict liability was apparently im-
posed against the dealer in Brandenburger, 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268.
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ports the proposition that a dealer may be subject to strict
liability.2ss
Because Hiigel and Thompson involved new goods, the courts
did not reach the issue of whether strict liability applies to the sale
of used goods. A court might not hold the seller of a used car to
the same strict liability as the seller of a new car, for the car may
have been safe when it left the manufacturer's hands, previous
owners may have modified or improperly maintained the car, the
purchaser may have contemplated that the condition was defec-
tive, or the possibility of economic loss may have been allocated by
contract.5 4 In Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co.,285 the Su-
preme Court of Illinois refused to apply strict liability to a used
car dealer where the plaintiff made no allegation that a used car
was defective when it left the manufacturer or that the dealer cre-
ated the defect.28 6 In the absence of statute or case law, the court
found no public policy that imposed responsibility on used car
dealers for the safety of cars sold.28
7
A dissenting opinion would have applied strict liability to a
dealer who actively makes faulty repairs or who passively fails to
inspect for the same policy reason that strict liability applies to a
manufacturer: the one who places the product in the stream of
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f (1965) states in part:
The rule stated in this Section applies to any person engaged in the business of
selling products for use or consumption. It therefore applies to any manufacturer
of such a product, to any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor, and to the oper-
ator of a restaurant.
See also Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964); Maure, Inc., 98 Misc. 2d 979, 414 N.Y.S.2d 882.
284. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) does not state whether the rule is
applicable to the seller of a defective used product. In Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65
N.J. 336, 344, 322 A.2d 440, 444 (1974), the court stated:
The strict liability in tort rule is, of course, grounded in reasons of public policy
.... It may well be that these policy reasons are not fully applicable to the seller
of a used chattel-for example, the buyer cannot be said to expect the same qual-
ity and durability in a used car as in a new one and so the used car dealer should
not be held to the same strict liability as the seller of new automobiles.
285. 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975).
286. Both the majority and the dissent in Peterson cited Realmuto as holding a dealer
strictly liable for a defect in a part that the dealer installed. Discussing the application of
strict liability to a used car dealer, the New Jersey court stated that "[als far as the theory
of implied warranty of merchantability is concerned, our courts have said that it is a con-
cept synonymous with strict liability in tort in a 'defect' case." Realmuto, 65 N.J. at 343,
440 A.2d at 443. The court's itemization of aspects of this interplay that a trial court must
consider is instructive.
287. Peterson, 61 Ill. 2d at 21, 329 N.E.2d at 787. In Montana, public policy has im-
posed a responsibility on used car dealers with respect to the safety of the cars. Kopischke
v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 610 P.2d 668 (1980).
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commerce should bear the responsibility for loss."8 Noting that
used cars are often sold "as is" because the cost of repairs may
exceed the value of the car, the opinion stated that a jury could
weigh the cost of remedying the dangerous condition against the
risk it created. 89 In other words, it may be socially advantageous
for a dealer to junk a car rather than sell it in unfit condition.
Close to the reasoning of the dissent in Peterson is the Mon-
tana Supreme Court's decision in Kopischke v. First Continental
Corp. °90 Although that decision was grounded in analysis of the
seller's negligence, when synthesized with the court's reasoning in
Thompson, it suggests that strict liability may appropriately apply
to the sale of a used car. In both cases, the seller was unable to
disclaim liability by using an "as is" disclaimer, as often occurs in
the sale of used goods. The goal of accident prevention, articulated
in Kopischke, is best served by imposing strict liability on the
seller, who would be compelled to either cure the defects or remove
the car from the market.
While the defect in Kopischke caused a personal injury, the
defect in Thompson did not. Strict liability should not be used to
guarantee that the level of performance of a used car equals that of
a new car. 9 1 But to achieve the goal of requiring dealers to cure
defects that affect safety, courts could apply it where a dangerous
defect actually causes only economic loss. In Maure v. Fordham
Motor Sales, Inc., 92 a New York trial court stated that "[i]t is the
policy of this state to protect purchasers of used vehicles from be-
ing sold defective vehicles." The court did not reach the issue of
strict liability, for it found the dealer liable on a warranty of ser-
viceability.29 3 The court left the impression, however, that it would
have decided against the dealer on strict liability if no other theory
had been available.2 9' Similarly, in Thompson, by imposing strict
liability on the seller, the Montana Supreme Court served the goal
of providing a purchaser with a remedy when goods do not attain a
reasonable level of performance.
288. Peterson, 61 Ill. 2d at 22-23, 329 N.E.2d at 788 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 23, 329 N.E.2d at 788 (citing Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2d 614, 126
N.E.2d 836 (1955)).
290. 187 Mont. 471, 610 P.2d 668 (1980), discussed supra Part II.C.
291. "The seller certainly does not undertake to provide a product that will never wear
out." Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 54 (1966).
292. 98 Misc. 2d 979, 414 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1979).
293. Id. at -, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 885. On the warranty of serviceability, see infra
notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
294. Id. at - , 414 N.Y.S.2d at 885-86 (citing numerous sources advocating the ap-
plication of strict liability to used car dealers).
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C. Alternative Dispute Mechanisms
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975 encourages sellers
to establish dispute resolution mechanisms. 95 If a seller establishes
an arbitration program that qualifies under the regulations,2 9 6 the
seller can require the consumer to follow the procedures before
bringing a court action.
The mechanism may afford relief to the purchaser of a used
car as well. Most automobile manufacturers write such a program
into their new car warranties. A consumer who purchases a used
car that is still covered by the new car warranty is eligible to use a
mechanism that is incorporated into the warranty. Furthermore,
the Montana New Motor Vehicle Warranty Act of 1985,97 popu-
larly known as the "Lemon Law," establishes a "warranty period"
of two years or 18,000 miles, whichever comes first, for new cars
sold after October 1, 1985.9 8 This statutory extension of the manu-
facturer's warranty only extends the warranty for claims arising
under the Lemon Law.29 9
It appears, however, that this statutory warranty does not ap-
ply to a subsequent purchaser who buys the car after the expira-
tion of the manufacturer's warranty. The definition of "consumer"
in the act includes "any person to whom the motor vehicle is trans-
ferred during the duration of an express warranty applicable to
the motor vehicle."30 0 If a manufacturer warrants a car for 12,000
miles, then a purchaser of the car when it has 11,000 miles obtains
the benefits of the statutory extension of the manufacturer's war-
ranty for Lemon Law purposes; a purchaser when it has 13,000
miles does not. Yet the same car would be covered by the Lemon
Law to 18,000 miles had the original purchaser retained it. This
seems an oversight, as the car is warranted, not the purchaser.
295. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (1982) provides: "Congress hereby declares it to be its pol-
icy to encourage warrantors to establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are fairly
and expeditiously settled through informal dispute settlement mechanisms."
296. 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1986). Because-of the location of these regulations in the Code,
settlement procedures are informally known as "703 mechanisms."
297. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-501 to -533 (1985).
298. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-4-501(6) (1985) provides: "'Warranty period' means the
period ending 2 years after the date of the original delivery to the consumer of a new motor
vehicle or during the first 18,000 miles of operation, whichever is earlier."
The original Montana Lemon Law, effective as to cars sold between October 1, 1983 and
September 30, 1985, established as a warranty period "the term of an express agreement or
the period ending 1 year" after delivery, whichever came first. Since most manufacturers
offer a 12 month/12,000 mile warranty on new cars, the original law did not affect warranty
duration.
299. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 61-4-503 (1985).
300. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-4-501(2) (1985) (emphasis added).
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Most manufacturer's dispute resolution mechanisms go well
beyond the requirements of the Lemon Law. Many manufacturers
voluntarily agree to submit to mediation and arbitration disputes
involving cars that are out of warranty. 301 Even if ineligible under
the Lemon Law, therefore, the purchaser of a used car which has
an expired manufacturer's warranty may still obtain relief. Unlike
defects in new cars, however, defects in used cars might not be the
responsibility of the manufacturer. A purchaser who pursues a
claim against a manufacturer must demonstrate that the problem
is attributable to the manufacturer, and not to a dealer, repair
shop, previous owner, or other intervening agency.30
The purchaser has little to lose by utilizing a manufacturer's
dispute resolution mechanism. The complaint may be resolved in
mediation. If it goes to arbitration, the dispute will be resolved
quickly and at no cost. A consumer may accept or reject the arbi-
trator's decision. If accepted, the decision is binding on the manu-
facturer. If rejected, the consumer may pursue the matter in court.
In that event, the arbitrator's decision may be offered in
evidence.303
D. Consent Orders and Class Actions
Owners of particular models of automobiles may be eligible for
specific relief ordered by an administrative agency or court. For
example, in 1983, General Motors agreed to a consent order in an
action brought by the FTC involving three components in millions
of cars produced between 1976 and 1983.304 Purchasers of used cars
containing these components are eligible for the program. The or-
der requires that the manufacturer submit the consumer's claim to
mediation and arbitration. If the parties are unable to settle the
301. It would not be worthwhile to enumerate the coverage of each manufacturer, as
they are subject to change. Ford and Chrysler have established their own dispute resolution
mechanisms. Other manufacturers, including General Motors and American Motors, have
contracted with the Better Business Bureau (BBB) to administer their mechanism. After
pursuing a claim with the manufacturer, consumers should contact the BBB to determine
the eligibility of their claim under the mechanism. The nearest BBB offices are in Spokane,
Denver, and Minneapolis.
302. A consumer with a grievance against a dealer or repair shop should inquire
whether the dealer participates in AUTOCAP, a dealer's dispute resolution mechanism. Ex-
tensive regulations regarding repairs, maintenance, and service are found in MoNT. ADMIN.
R. §§ 8.78.201-.203 (1981).
303. 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1986).
304. Decision and Order, Docket No. 9145, November 16, 1983. The three specified
components are (1) THM 200 automatic transmissions manufactured through April 26,
1983, (2) camshafts or lifters in 305 or 350 CID gasoline engines produced through April 26,
1983, and (3) fuel injection pumps or fuel injectors in 350 CID diesel engines produced
through April 26, 1983.
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claim, an arbitrator will fashion a remedy. The Better Business
Bureau administers this dispute resolution program.
Unlike the consent order described above, the recent settle-
ment of a class action suit brought against General Motors pro-
vided that the settlement would be available only to original pur-
chasers.305 Subsequent purchasers of these models are not without
a remedy, however, for they may be eligible to pursue their claims
under the manufacturer's dispute resolution program.306 Eligibility
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
This section provides only examples of consent orders and
class actions. A purchaser who wishes information about claims in-
volving a particular make and model should contact the manufac-
turer, the FTC, the Better Business Bureau, or the state Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs.
VIII. PROPOSED- ALTERNATIVES
A. Introduction
This article has explored some of the federal statutes that af-
fect used car sales as well as state statutes that are more or less
uniform, such as the UCC and CPA. In addition to these broad-
based approaches, some jurisdictions have adopted particular stat-
utes to address problems in the used car market.0 7 Some states
require that dealers inspect used cars and disclose known defects,
an alternative which was proposed by the FTC and rejected by
Congress. 30 8 Others require that dealers repair the defects, or at
least those that affect safety. Others forbid disclaimers of war-
ranty, thereby furnishing sellers an incentive to remedy defects.
Finally, others use a creative combination of these approaches to
create a market in which sellers and purchasers can make decisions
based on more accurate information.
305. The settlement entered September 24, 1984, involved 350 and 260 CID V-8 diesel




Garden City, NY 11530
306. A subsequent purchaser should contact the BBB for details. See supra note 301.
307. A number of statutes not cited here can be found in Cohan and Bailey, Defective
Motor Vehicles-Warranty Rights and Practical Remedies for Consumer Purchasers, 65
MASs. L. REv. 33, 42-43 (1980).
308. See supra text accompanying notes 185-88.
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B. Forbid Disclaimer of Warranties
One of the weaknesses of the UCC is its failure to distinguish
between consumer transactions and other commercial transactions.
Some legislatures have remedied this weakness by forbidding the
disclaimer of implied warranties in merchant sales to consumers.
Under this approach, a merchant seller is required to warrant that
a used car is merchantable. The level of performance a purchaser
could expect from a used car would still be subject to such vari-
ables as age, mileage, and prior use. But because the warranty is
mandatory, a seller has an incentive to furnish a car that complies
with a minimum standard. The following statute from Massachu-
setts typifies this approach:
EXCEPTION AS TO EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF WARRANTIES,
ETC. IN SALES OF CONSUMER GoODS.
The provisions of section 2-316 shall not apply to sales of
consumer goods, services or both. Any language, oral or written,
used by a seller or manufacturer of consumer goods and services,
which attempts to exclude or modify any implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude
or modify the consumer's remedies for breach of those warranties,
shall be unenforceable.
Any language, oral or written, used by a manufacturer of con-
sumer goods, which attempts to limit or modify a consumer's
remedies for breach of such manufacturer's express warranties,
shall be unenforceable, unless such manufacturer maintains facili-
ties within the commonwealth sufficient to provide reasonable
and expeditious performance of the warranty obligations.
The provisions of this section may not be disclaimed or
waived by agreement.3 "
The Massachusetts statute forbidding disclaimer of warranties
is buttressed by regulations promulgated under the Consumer Pro-
tection Act3 0 that require affirmative disclosures.311 In Calimlim v.
309. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106 § 2-316A (Law. Co-op. 1984).
310. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A (Law. Co-op. 1984).
311. McEttrick, Defective Motor Vehicles: The Massachusetts Lemon Law and Recent
Used Car Cases Under Chapter 93A, 70 MASS. L. REV. 30, 38 (1985) states that these regula-
tions include:
The fact that a vehicle is a used vehicle, or that the vehicle has been utilized as a
demonstrator, taxi cab, police car, or rental vehicle must be disclosed. The implied
warranty of merchantability must be disclosed in a written contract of sale. The
right to rescind... for failure to pass the safety and emission inspection must be
disclosed. Prohibited are attempts to limit or to imply a limitation on warranties
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. It is a ... violation for a
dealer to fail to inform a purchaser on request of the name and address of the
prior owner of the vehicle.
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Foreign Car Center, Inc.,-1 2 the seller marketed a used car with the
required disclosures. s The trial court found that the dealer knew
the car was dangerous and not in good condition at the time of sale
to the purchasers: the brakes were defective and the car required
over $3000 worth of repairs. The appellate court upheld an award
of damages for breach of the warranty of fitness, breach of the im-
plied warranty of merchantability, violation of the CPA, and attor-
neys' fees. " "
C. Create an Implied Warranty of Serviceability
Other jurisdictions expressly require the dealer to warrant
that the vehicle will perform according to a certain level, a war-
ranty known as the implied warranty of serviceability. In New
York, a dealer must warrant that the car ". . . is in condition and
repair to render, under normal use, satisfactory and adequate ser-
vice upon the public highway at the time of delivery." The New
York statute provides:
CERTIFICATES BY RETAIL DEALERS ON SALES OF SECOND HAND MOTOR
VEHICLES.
Upon the sale or transfer of title by a retail dealer of any
second hand motor vehicle, intended for use by the buyer, his
agent or representative upon the public highways, the vendor
shall execute and deliver to the vendee an instrument in writing,
in a form prescribed by the commissioner, in which shall be given
the make, year of manufacture and identification number of the
said motor vehicle, the name and address of the vendee, and the
date of delivery to the vendee. Such notice shall also contain a
certification that said motor vehicle complies with such require-
ments of this chapter as shall be specified by the commissioner
and that it is in condition and repair to render, under normal use,
satisfactory and adequate service upon the public highway at the
312. 392 Mass. 228, 467 N.E.2d 443 (1984).
313. The court stated:
The motor vehicle purchase contract contained language that the vehicle was
"warranted to be safe and merchantable and to pass the Massachusetts [vehicle]
safety inspection program at the time of delivery" to the buyer. Moreover, it re-
cited the following language, which is required by MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 940, §
5.04(2)(g) (1978): "Attention purchaser. All vehicles are warranted as a matter of
state law. They must be fit to be driven safely on the roads and must remain in
good running condition for a reasonable period of time. If you have significant
problems with this vehicle or if it will not pass inspection, you should notify the
dealer immediately. He may be required to fix the car or refund your money. This
warranty is in addition to any other warranty given by the dealer."
Id. at -, 467 N.E.2d at 444-45.
314. Id. at - , 467 N.E.2d at 447-48. The Supreme Judicial Court disallowed a
double recovery under these claims.
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The failure of the vendor to deliver to the vendee the certifi-
cate required by this section and delivery of a false certificate
knowing the same to be false or misleading or without making an
appropriate inspection to determine whether the contents of such
certificate are true shall constitute a violation of this section. The
delivery of a false certificate shall raise presumption that such
certificate was issued without an appropriate inspection.3 15
In Natale v. Martin Volkswagen, Inc.,31" the court held that
the warranty of serviceability applicable to used cars went beyond
the implied warranties of the UCC and could not be waived. The
court awarded the plaintiff the cost of repairs in addition to the
cost of the vehicle. Since the damages exceeded the amount which
would compensate the plaintiff, presumably the court granted a re-
scission rather than damages for breach of warranty.
Similar statutes in jurisdictions that have inspection laws re-
quire that the seller prepare the vehicle to pass the inspection . 1 7
Such statutes protect both the consumer and the public. Montana
does not mandate regular inspections. However, the legislature has
enacted extensive safety requirements for vehicles, providing that
it is a misdemeanor to drive a vehicle that does not meet the re-
quirements.31 8 Without mandating inspections, the state could
adopt a statute placing upon dealers the burden of preparing a mo-
tor vehicle to meet the safety requirements. In a number of states,
dealers who sell cars that do not meet safety requirements may
lose their licenses.3 1 9
D. Disclaimer With Knowledge
Another approach is to allow the purchaser to disclaim im-
plied warranties only if the purchaser has actual knowledge of de-
fects. Under this approach, the seller's disclosure of a defect would
shift to the purchaser the responsibility for curing the defect. Such
315. N. Y. VEH. & TRAu. LAW § 417 (McKinney 1970).
316. 92 Misc. 2d 1046, 402 N.Y.S.2d 156 (City Ct. of Utica 1978).
317. N. Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW § 301(a) (McKinney 1970) provides:
PERIODIC INSPECTION OF ALL MOTOR VEHICLES
The commissioner shall require that every motor vehicle registered in this
state be inspected once each year in accordance with the provisions of this article,
and that every motor vehicle sold or transferred for use on the public highways of
this state by a dealer licensed under section four hundred fifteen of this chapter to
any person other than another such licensed dealer must be inspected and bear a
valid certificate of inspection prior to delivery to the purchaser or transferee.
318. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-9-109(1) (1985).
319. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-64 (1985); CAL. VEH. CODE § 11713(i) (1971).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-4-101 (1985) provides for the licensing of motor vehicle dealers.
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a provision would be useful at the low-price end of the market,
where defects are more numerous, and could be attractive to do-it-
yourself purchasers. On the other hand, the statute would not pro-
tect the public or purchasers who assumed the risk of defects but
did not cure them. The disclosure, like an "as is" assumption of
risk, 320 might not protect the seller from liability for personal in-
jury caused by safety defects.3 21 Therefore the statute would pro-
vide an incentive for the dealer with knowledge of defects to repair
those defects and not merely to disclose them. A Kansas statute
provides:
DISCLAIMER OR LIMITATION OF WARRANTIES; LIABILITIES; ATTORNEY
FEES, WHEN; SECTION INAPPLICABLE TO SEED FOR PLANTING OR LIVE-
STOCK FOR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES.
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, with respect
to property which is the subject of or is intended to become the
subject of a consumer transaction in this state, no supplier shall:
(1) Exclude, modify or otherwise attempt to limit the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose;
or
(c) A supplier may limit the supplier's implied warranty of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose with respect
to a defect or defects in the property only if the supplier estab-
lishes that the consumer had knowledge of the defect or defects,
which become the basis of the bargain between the parties. In
neither case shall such limitation apply to liability for personal
injury or property damage.
(e) A disclaimer or limitation in violation of this section is
void.""2
In Dale v. King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 23 the consumer pur-
chased a used car with a 30-day express warranty. The engine
failed after 50 days. The dealer had no knowledge that the engine
was defective at the time of sale. The Supreme Court of Kansas
held that a dealer may not, by giving the purchaser a narrow ex-
press warranty, avoid the statutory requirement that a dealer may
not exclude, modify, or limit the implied warranty of
merchantability. The seller did not disclose the defects to the pur-
chaser, which would have limited the warranty under the statute.
Therefore, the seller warranted that the car was fit for the ordinary
320. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
321. See Bergstresser v. Van Hoy, 142 Kan. 88, 45 P.2d 855 (1935).
322. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639(a)(1), (c) (1983).
323. 234 Kan. 840, 676 P.2d 744 (1984).
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purpose of an automobile. Because the car was relatively new, it
did not meet that level of fitness when it failed after a few days.3 24
E. Varying Levels of Warranty
When courts apply the implied warranty of merchantability to
used car sales, they are required to ascertain a level of expected
performance that is adaptable to vehicles of varying quality. More-
over, it is not until after the fact of a breakdown that they have to
determine the degree of fitness to which a particular purchaser was
entitled at the time of sale. That is, they must determine after the
sale what a purchaser should have been promised before the sale.
Some jurisdictions have eased this difficulty by establishing a
sliding scale of warranties. The extent of the warranty may be a
function of the age of the car, the sale price of the car, or may be
determined by the seller. Furthermore, under this system the
dealer is responsible for repairs required during the warranty pe-
riod. This responsibility relieves the purchaser of the burden of
proving that the car was defective at the time of sale.325 An Illinois
statute warrants the powertrain components on a sliding scale that
is a function of the age of the car:
RETAIL SALE OF MOTOR VEHICLES
§ 2L. Any retail sale of a motor vehicle made after January 1,
1968 to a consumer by a new motor vehicle dealer or used motor
vehicle dealer within the meaning of Chapter 5 of The Illinois
Vehicle Code is made subject to this Section.
(a) The dealer is liable to the purchasing consumer for the
following share of the cost of the repair of Power Train compo-
nents for a period of 30 days from date of delivery, unless such
repairs have become necessary by abuse, negligence, or collision.
The burden of establishing that a claim for repairs is not within
this Section shall be on the selling dealer. The dealer's share of
such repair costs is:
(1) in the case of a motor vehicle which is not more than 2
years old, 50%;
(2) in the case of a motor vehicle which is 2 or more, but less
than 3 years old, 25%;
(3) in the case of a motor vehicle which is 3 or more, but less
than 4 years old, 10%; and
(4) in the case of a motor vehicle which is 4 or more years
old, none.
(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, such a dealer and a
324. Id. at 843, 676 P.2d at 748.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 100-107.
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purchasing consumer may negotiate a sale and purchase that is
not subject to this Section if there is stamped on any purchase
order, contract, agreement, or other instrument to be signed by
the consumer as a part of that transaction, in at least 10-point
bold type immediately above the signature line, the following:
"THIS VEHICLE IS SOLD AS IS WITH NO WARRANTY AS
TO MECHANICAL CONDITION 3 2 6
An alternate scheme would require that used cars sold for
more than a specific price be accompanied by an implied warranty
of merchantability for a prescribed period of months. Because the
level of fitness a purchaser can expect is a direct function of price,
the purchaser's pricing decision is more rational. An Australian
state statute provides that if the price of the car is over $1000, 311
the dealer must repair any defect that occurs within 5000 kilome-
ters or three months, whichever occurs first; if the price is $500 to
$1000, 3000 kilometers or two months; if the price is under $500,
the statute does not apply.s2 The purchaser need not demonstrate
that the car was defective at the time of sale.3 29 The dealer's repair
obligation does not apply, however, if the dealer disclosed to the
purchaser the defect and the estimated cost of repair.330
A similar system might require dealers to give used cars a rat-
ing, with higher-rated cars receiving a better warranty.331 The sys-
tem would leave it to the dealers to determine the rating a particu-
lar car would receive. Presumably purchasers would be willing to
pay more for higher-rated cars and dealers would have an incentive
to repair automobiles to achieve a higher rating.
IX. CONCLUSION
This article enumerates problems that frequently arise in the
326. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 262L (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
327. An Australian dollar is currently worth $.71 American. If the statute has not been
amended to account for inflation, its application would be severely restricted.
328. Secondhand Motor Vehicle Act of 1971, State of South Australia § 24.
329. Id.
330. Id. at § 25.
331. Legislation proposed in California would have enacted this system:
On any used vehicle offered for sale at a price in excess of $1000 a dealer could
offer one of three 'rated' warranties. An 'A' rating warranty promises the car to be
free from mechanical defects for either 120 days or the first 4000 miles driven, a
'B' rating warranty makes the same promise for 90 days or 3000 miles and a 'C'
rating warranty promises 60 days or 2000 miles. A car sold with a 'D' rating would
carry no warranty whatsoever and would be sold on an 'as is' basis.
J. McCALL, CONSUMER PROTECTION 74 (1977).
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sale of used cars and outlines solutions that have been fashioned
by courts and legislatures. The problems stem largely from the fact
that the seller of a used car knows more about the condition of the
car than the purchaser, but is generally not obligated to improve
the condition or disclose the knowledge. Traditional contract law,
based on classical economic theory, makes few allowances for the
unknowledgeable purchaser. As a result, in a hard case, courts may
find the facts inapplicable to the rules, find the rules inapplicable
to the facts, or find tort law that supplants inapplicable contract
law. While courts thereby resolve a particular case, the outcomes
are collectively unfortunate in a system that relies on precedent for
predictability.
Modern consumer legislation faces the problem more squarely,
regulating the seller by prohibiting certain practices or by requir-
ing certain disclaimers. There is a danger that an overly regulated
market may prove inefficient for both purchasers and sellers.
Before attacking the problem with additional regulation, we should
look behind the body of law that has developed to discover the
questions it is straining to answer.
The fundamental question appears to be: To what level of per-
formance is the purchaser of a used car entitled?,3 2 The perform-
ance that can be expected from used cars is a function of many
factors, including the make, model, year, and mileage. These fac-
tors are reflected in the price, with more desirable models and
lower-mileage cars commanding a higher market price. All other
factors being equal, the market price can be determined by objec-
tive criteria, as reported in industry publications, such as the Blue
Book.
But all other factors are not equal, the main variant being de-
fects in the car. Purchasers should not assume the risk of all de-
fects existing at the time of sale. They lack the knowledge to dis-
cover the defects. And the defects may result in personal injury or
substantial economic loss.
On the other hand, sellers cannot be guarantors oof the condi-
tion of used cars.33 3 Purchasers cannot expect to obtain the same
performance from a used car as they would obtain from a new car.
332. One author concludes, "a second-hand vehicle sold for use and not scrap must at
the time of sale and for a reasonable time thereafter be free of any material defect making it
incapable of safe and lawful use." Whincup, Reasonable Fitness of Cars, 38 MOD. L. REv.
660, 670 (1975).
333. This statement may not apply to sellers of new cars. In Gindy Mfg. Corp. v.
Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (1970), the court refused to
honor an "as is" clause in the sale of new vehicles, reasoning that trade custom anticipates
"as is" disclaimers in the sale of used goods but not in the sale of new goods.
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If the vehicle fails in some respect after the purchaser has driven it
some distance, the purchaser should have no recourse when the
failure is due to the deterioration of the parts over time (a fancy
way of saying "used") and not due to some defect existing at the
time of sale.
Sellers and purchasers distribute the risk of performance
through price. They can also distribute the risk of defects through
a warranty. In a sale with a warranty, the seller warrants only the
condition of the car at the time of sale, not its continued perform-
ance. Therefore the purchaser must demonstrate that the break-
down occurred because of a defect present at the time of sale. Hav-
ing proved that element, the purchaser has a remedy under the
warranty.
Sale "as is" shifts virtually all risk to the purchaser. The FTC
Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule does not alter the dis-
tribution of risk. In fact, the rule may enhance the seller's position.
By putting the purchaser on notice that oral representations are
not binding and by clarifying the meaning of sale "as is," the rule
may undercut a purchaser's argument that the sale was induced by
fraudulent or unconscionable practices.
The shift of risk to the purchaser is appropriate where it re-
flects the purchaser's expectation of the level of performance of the
car. That expectation is meaningful only when the purchaser has
knowledge of the condition of the car. The shift of risk to the pur-
chaser is not appropriate where the seller is in a position to know
of defects but is under no obligation to affirmatively disclose that
knowledge. Under current law, the seller may have no obligation to
disclose the defects. Misrepresentation is fraud; failure to disclose
generally is not. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS addresses
the issue of when failure to disclose is equivalent to a misrepresen-
tation, stating cautiously:
Nevertheless, a party need not correct all mistakes of the other
and is expected only to act in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable standards of fair dealing, as reflected in prevailing
business ethics.3 4
Prevailing business ethics do change, as reflected in the significant
shift from caveat emptor to consumer protection in the last two
generations.83 5 In the area of used car sales, however, business eth-
334. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 comment d (1981).
335. Consider, for example, the obligations imposed on a real estate broker in Califor-
nia. See Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App. 3d, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1983) (duty to disclose that
murder had been committed in house); Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 383 (1984) (affirmative duty to discover and disclose defects); Annot., 46 A.L.R. 4th
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ics have been slow to change. 36
The imbalance in the parties' knowledge and bargaining power
generally leads to the risk being borne by the purchaser. Where a
defect may lead to personal injury, courts have recognized that the
shift of risk to the purchaser is not appropriate. They have im-
posed an obligation on used car dealers to inspect and correct
safety defects. This obligation should be extended to defects that
lead to economic loss as well. A defect that causes only economic
loss should be corrected by the one who has the earliest opportu-
nity to do so. The expense of inspection and correction probably
outweighs the economic loss resulting from failure of the compo-
nent. Most importantly, the issue of whether a defect would lead
to merely economic loss or would result in personal injury should
not be determined after a breakdown. The burden should be
placed on the seller to correct the defects before they result in a
loss. 337
Alternatively, the distinction between defects affecting safety
and defects resulting in economic loss could be used to determine
when dealers must correct defects and when they must disclose
them. If defects relate to safety, disclosure is inadequate. Purchas-
ers should be protected against their own failure to attend to the
problem. But if the defects do not relate to safety, disclosure
would suffice. Purchasers would then be in a position to determine
whether to correct the defects. The burden of determining the cat-
egory of defect would be on the seller, who would have an incentive
to repair a defect that might lead to personal injury.
Requiring sellers to disclose known defects makes both ethical
and economic sense. 3s Caveat emptor is appropriate only when
the assumptions of classical economic theory are present. One of
those assumptions is that perfect information is available to both
purchasers and sellers. Presently, purchasers are generally ignorant
546 (1986).
336. In Dale v. King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 234 Kan. 840, 844, 676 P.2d 744, 748
(1984), the Kansas Supreme Court stated: "The sale of used cars by dealers in Kansas is no
longer governed by the maxim caveat emptor-let the buyer beware. The consumer protec-
tion act now places the responsibility upon the seller, not the purchaser, to determine the
quality and condition of the goods."
337. See Comment, Used Car Dealer's Duty to Disclose Major Known Defects, 20 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 399 (1983).
338. The disclosure could be affirmatively mandated, as in the proposed but never-
adopted FTC rule. See supra text accompanying notes 185-89. Alternatively, market forces
could induce the disclosure. For example, if purchasers were not permitted to waive implied
warranties, sellers might find it advantageous to remedy or disclose defects rather than pay
for them later. This result would be more certain if the purchaser's remedy was enhanced by
punitive damages or attorneys' fees.
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about auto mechanics and rely on the representations of dealers.
The market at present does not encourage dealers to disclose infor-
mation to consumers. A rational purchaser, attempting compara-
tive shopping but not knowing the condition of the cars, will
choose the car with the lowest price. Therefore, if both the pur-
chaser and the seller act rationally, the purchaser will end up with
a defective car. If the information was available, purchasers would
still buy used cars with defects. Knowing what they were getting,
however, they would pay a lower price to assume the risks.339
Much consumer legislation, such as Truth-in-Lending and
Magnuson-Moss, takes the direction of requiring or encouraging
disclosure. Under this type of legislation, excessive government in-
tervention does not regulate the market.340 Instead, informed con-
sumers can make choices. 341 This results in a closer approach to
free market conditions rather than an overly regulated economy.
339. If this analysis is accurate, then in the present market where some states require
disclosure and others do not, rational sellers would attempt to sell the most defective units
in states that do not require disclosure.
340. Nor is the government required for enforcement. Most modern consumer statutes
contain provisions for attorneys' fees for successful prosecution. Attorneys are thereby depu-
tized as "private attorneys general" to enforce through the marketplace the public policy of
the state. See supra notes 14, 237-39 and accompanying text.
341. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 161-64 (1982).
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